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THERE OUGHT TO BE A LAW: THE DISCLOSURE FOCUS OF
RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR NONPROFIT REFORM
DANA BRAKMAN REISER*

In response to news of scandals in nonprofit organizations large and

small, prestigious and obscure, states and the federal government have
begun to tout legislative solutions to the perceived nonprofit accountability
gap.' These legislative reform initiatives have been linked, by their proponents and by commentators, to the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-

Oxley" or "the Act") passed in response to Enron and the other major forprofit scandals of the early 2000s.2 One can obviously link the two sets of
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Program and the
able research assistance of Libby Bakalar, Matthew Kelly, Yuliya Levitan, and Joan Robinson. Iappreciate the comments and suggestions of Evelyn Brody, Harvey Dale, Marion Fremont-Smith, Claire
Kelly, Jeff Reiser, Richard Schmalbeck, and Norm Silber. I am also grateful for the feedback I received
from the other participants and attendees at the Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium, Who Guards
the Guardians?: Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity Governance, and the participants in the

Brooklyn Law School Junior Faculty Workshop Series. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1. See, e.g., S. 4836-B, 226th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter N.Y. Senate Bill]; Office
of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public
Charities: Draft 1.0, available at http://www.providers.org/Charities%20Fin%201ntegrity%20Legis%2OJan%2004.pdf [hereinafter Mass. Draft Leg.]; see The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal.
Stat. ch. 919 (as signed by governor Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://wvw.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1262_bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf [hereinafter Cal Act]; STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 108TH CONG., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].

2. See, e-g, Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
Proposes Reforms of State Corporate Accountability Laws (Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter N.Y. AG Press Release]; Press Release, California Office of the Attorney General, Attorney
General Lockyer Unveils Reforms to Toughen Nonprofit Accountability, Fundraiser Controls: Audit,
Disclosure and Compensation Provisions Seek to Protect Charities and Donors 1 (Feb. 12, 2004) (describing the AG's reform proposal and its imminent introduction by state Senator Sher), availableat

http://caag.state.ea.us/newsalerts/2004/04-018.htm

[hereinafter Cal. AG Press Release]; Office of

Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public
Charities: Summary of Draft 1.0, at 1, available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Building%20Strong%20Ethical%2OFoundations/Mass.AG.Act-to promote.fin-integpub-charities.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Mass. AG Summary]. See generally Michael Anft & Grant Williams, States
Propose New Accountability Regulations for Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 19,
2004, at 8; Michael Anft & Grant Williams, Redefining Good Governance, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Aug. 19, 2004, at 6. But see ALLIANCE FOR NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, CONFERENCE REPORT,
CHANGING NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY: How WILL IT AFFECT YOUR ORGANIZATION? (Sept. 24,
2003) (quoting from AG Spitzer's remarks at this conference, in which he criticized "the metaphor that
we have applied Sarbanes-Oxley to the nonprofit sector. It's not an appropriate metaphor."), available
at http://www.angonline.org/2003summary.pdf. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in the summer of
2002, on the heels of several major corporate and accounting scandals. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
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reforms in terms of timing, as the first of the legislative proposals for nonprofit reform surfaced just a few months following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. 3 More interesting, however, is the substantive link between
these two sets of reforms, particularly their shared emphasis on a disclosure
model of regulation. This Article explores this disclosure focus of recent
legislative proposals for nonprofit reform and evaluates the ability of disclosure-based reforms to improve nonprofits' accountability, either alone or
in concert with other regulatory approaches.
Part I chronicles this most recent chapter in the long, but often meager, history of nonprofit enforcement. It begins by describing the first foray
into nonprofit reform legislation "adopting reforms similar to those enacted
by the federal Sarbanes-Oxley law," spearheaded by New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer and his Charities Bureau. 4 In addition, it offers background on the similarly comprehensive draft legislation released by Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, and on some of the more limited
proposals under review in other states. This Part also introduces the nascent
but sweeping federal agenda for nonprofit legislative reform recently publicized by the U.S. Senate Finance Committee. Although this federal reform
project is only at the discussion stage, the current information publicly
available suggests that over 200 separate legislative reforms may be under
consideration. 5 It is impossible to predict the ultimate path these reform
efforts will take. Part I concludes by reporting the current state of their
evolution.
Part II highlights the disclosure focus of each of these efforts at nonprofit legislative reform. Two disclosure-focused techniques, again with
obvious links to Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly stand out. First, there have
been proposals at both the state and federal levels that would require officers to certify the accuracy and reliability of organizational reports or filings. 6 Second, virtually all of the recent proposals share an emphasis on
auditing, either as part of a comprehensive agenda or as a standalone reform.7 In addition to these recurrent ideas, various other state and federal
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29

U.S.C.).
3. See N.Y. AG Press Release, supra note 2, at I (announcing New York's effort in January
2003).
4. See Memorandum from the Attorney General of New York, Eliot Spitzer, to the New York
State Senate and Assembly and Program Bill #02-03 (on file with author).
5. See White Paper, supra note 1; see also Brad Wolverton, Rethinking Charity Rules: Senate
Panel Offers 200 Ideas for Revising Nonprofit Regulation, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 22, 2004, at
31 (noting that the White Paper listed over 200 reform ideas).
6. See infra Part II(A).
7. See infra
Part II(B).
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proposals also rely on disclosure mechanisms. 8 In all of these proposals,
legislative drafters' faith in the ability of disclosure to improve nonprofit
accountability is evident.
Next, the Article questions the assumption that disclosure-focused reforms will be effective. Part III argues that for legislation adopting disclosure-based reforms to improve nonprofit accountability, the reforms must
either improve nonprofit behavior, facilitate enforcement in the nonprofit
sector, or both. A combination of factors will make it difficult for disclosure-based reforms such as officer certification and increased auditing to
improve the behavior of nonprofit organizations and actors. These factors
include the duplicative nature of some of the suggested reforms, their assumptions about nonprofit compliance, and the costs of their implementation. Part III also considers the potential for currently proposed disclosurebased reforms to facilitate enforcement by regulators or others. Unfortunately, significant resource and structural issues unique to the nonprofit
context also will make it difficult for many of these reforms to improve
nonprofit accountability by facilitating enforcement.
Bearing in mind the limits of disclosure reform, Part IV offers suggestions for legislators as they continue to consider such proposals: (1) invigorate enforcement and (2) increase education and training. Legislatures
should increase funding for state and federal regulators currently facing
vastly inadequate resources to meet their nonprofit enforcement responsibilities. Further, legislatures should support education and training efforts
to teach nonprofit fiduciaries and employees the skills they need to selfregulate and self-police. Disclosure-based reforms should be viewed as a
useful adjunct to fully funded governmental enforcement and knowledgeable, effective internal monitoring, and should be adopted only when they
will serve this purpose. Advances in disclosure technology, especially electronic filing, should be pursued to enable regulators to do more with less
and to use disclosures to target investigation and prosecution. Moreover, to
the extent their costs are not prohibitive, reforms that focus on guiding the
process of disclosure creation should be favored over those that primarily
increase disclosure outputs.
The Article concludes that the ability of disclosure-based reforms to
enhance nonprofit accountability may be overstated, but can be improved if
legislatures recognize the limits of the for-profit analogy and refashion
their reforms to complement enforcement. With many proposals for nonprofit reform still at an early stage, this kind of realignment remains possi-

8. See infra Part 11(C).
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ble, if reformers are willing to support this more appropriate regulatory
approach.
I.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR NONPROFIT REFORM

The recent crop of nonprofit reform proposals demonstrates a commitment to a disclosure model of regulation worthy of discussion and

analysis. Before beginning this exploration and critique, it is necessary to
provide a short history of their introduction and evolution.
A.

The States Move First

The proposal publicized by New York Attorney General ("AG") Eliot
Spitzer was the first of this new group of legislative reform efforts. AG
Spitzer announced his proposal in January 2003, as an effort to protect
consumers from fraud perpetrated by "not-for-profit entities that have custody of billions of dollars in charitable funds" by "strengthen[ing] state
laws to protect ...donors." 9 Shortly thereafter, the AG's proposal was

drafted into a bill proposing officer certification mandates, enhanced auditing requirements, and several other changes to the state's Not-for-Profit
Corporation Act,' 0 and was introduced in the New York State Senate., I

The scope of this initial version generated some alarm among members of
New York's nonprofit community, 12 and the bill was soon amended to

9. N.Y. AG Press Release, supra note 2, at 1.
10. See N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1.One part of the AG's proposal, its overhaul of the state's
regime for handling self-dealing transactions in nonprofit corporations, also was introduced in separate
bills in the state legislature in 2004. See S. 7219A, 226th Gen Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); A.
11292A, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2004).
11. At the request of the Attorney General, the bill was introduced in the state Senate by Senator
Leibell on April 23, 2003. It was referred to the Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions. See S.4836, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). See generally Wendy K. Szymanski,
An Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1303 (describing and analyzing the original version of the New York bill).
12. See Sarbanes-Oxley for Nonprofits, N.Y. NONPROFITS (Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of
N.Y.) Aug. 2003 (describing how amendments had addressed many of the nonprofit community's
concerns
regarding
the
legislation
initially
proposed),
available
at
http://www.npccny.org/info/gtiItOhtm; Fred Stokeld, Bill to Apply Sarbanes-Oxley to New York Nonprofits Revised, 100 TAX NOTES 753 (2003) (similar); Jay Dismukes, Attorney General's Office Discusses Proposed Nonprofit Legislation, TRUSTED PROF., Apr. 2003 (raising nonprofit accounting
professionals' concerns with regard tothe lower financial triggers in the original version), available at

http://www.nysscpa.org/trustedprof/archive/0403/lTp2a.htm; Simon Eskow, Charities Bureau Hosts
Symposium on Reform, TRUSTED PROF., June 2003 (reporting announcement by New York's AG that it
would raise financial triggers

edprof/archive/0603/ 1Tp6a.htm.

in an amended bill), available at http://www.nysscpa.org/trust-
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address many of their concerns. 13 The amended Senate bill remained in
committee through the end of the 2004 session, 14 as did a companion bill
introduced in the New York State Assembly. 15 These bills (the "New York
Proposals") were the most comprehensive and formalized state proposals
for nonprofit legislative reform for two years.
The New York AG's Charities Bureau announced an ambitious new
legislative agenda in March 2005.16 Among other proposals, this agenda
includes two bills revising the AG's earlier proposals for nonprofit legislative reform. 17 These bills (the "Revised New York Proposals") retain much
of the substance and a fair amount of the text of their predecessors. Yet, the
Revised New York Proposals do represent significant improvements, in
some ways along the lines this Article advocates. At this initial phase of
their development, it is difficult to predict the fate of these new bills, but
they surely merit continuing observation.
In late 2003, Massachusetts AG Tom Reilly made public a draft of a
bill containing provisions quite similar to the early New York Proposals.
Soon after, AG Reilly announced plans to file this bill with the state legis-

lature to enhance the financial accountability of the nonprofit sector. 18 This
bill also met with resistance from the nonprofits it would regulate. 19 The
13. The bill was amended in various respects and referred back to the committee on June 10,
2003; it was reassigned there at the opening of the new Senate session on January 7, 2004. See S, 4836A, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
14. The amended bill, S.4836-A, was amended again on June 16, 2004, and recaptioned S. 4836B. See N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1. The only change made by this amendment was to move the
effective date from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2005. Compare id., with S. 4836-A, 226th Gen.
Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
15. See A. 10239, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N-Y.2004). The Assembly bill is true companion legislation, tracking precisely the language of its Senate bill counterpart. Therefore, future references cite to the Senate version only.
16. See Office of New York State Attorney General, Charities Bureau 2005 Legislative Proposals, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/legislation.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). At the time this
Article was finalized, the AG's office had just released its proposed bills to the legislature and the
public. Before the state legislature can take action on them, they will have to be sponsored and formally
introduced, and reviewed by the committees to which they will be referred.
68-05,
at
Program,
Program
Bill
General's
Legislative
17. See
Attorney
http.//www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char _pdf/ag68-05.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter N.Y.
AG Program Bill 68-05]; Attorney General's Legislative Program, Program Bill 65-05, at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char__pdf/ag65-05.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter N.Y.
AG Program Bill 65-05].
18. Mass. AG Summary, supra note 2.
19. See Michael Rezendes & Sacha Pfeiffer, Legislation Eyed to Fight Abuses at Foundations,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al (reporting the comment by a Boston attorney that "adding new
laws that will substantially burden existing charities is not the way to deal with the wayward few");
Tom Witkowski & Jill Lemer, AG Mulling Sarhanes-like Rules for State Nonprofits, BOSTON Bus. J.,
nonprofit community), at
concerns of the Massachusetts
Feb.
27, 2004 (reporting
http://www.bizjoumals.com/boston/stories/2004/03/0l/story3.html?t-printable, Massachusetts Council
of Human Service Providers, Inc., Attorney General Legislation Comments (listing various concerns
regarding the AG's proposed legislation held by the Council and its members), at
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bill never was introduced in the state legislature, and plans for introducing
this or a similar bill no longer appear on the AG's legislative agenda. 20
The California legislature entertained and ultimately enacted a nonprofit reform bill on a speedy schedule after its introduction in February
2004 on behalf of AG Bill Lockyer. 2 1 While this new statute does contain
disclosure enhancements and auditing requirements for nonprofit organizations generally, these elements appear in a sea of reforms to the state's
charitable solicitation laws. 22 Again, perhaps in response to the concerns
raised by the nonprofit community,2 3 the bill was amended several times
before being passed by both houses of the state legislature. 24 The governor
signed it into law in late September 2004, and it went into effect January 1,
2005.25
Commentators and the press often have referred to the New York,
Massachusetts, and California efforts as Sarbanes-Oxley legislation for
nonprofits, 26 and some reports have so characterized legislation proposed
in other states. 27 A review of state legislative activity reveals, however, that
http://wwwproviders.org/Atorney%20General%20Legislation%20comments.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
20. See Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, Legislative Initiatives (mentioning only two current AG legislative reform initiatives relevant to nonprofit organizations, Senate
Bill 159, a bill to clarify and enhance penalties for theft of the identity of a charity, and House Bill 557,
a bill to require regulatory review of major asset transfers between nonprofit organizations), at
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfrn?pageid=1 679 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
21. The Nonprofit Integrity Aet., S. 1262, 2003-2004 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (version introduced in
California Senate on Feb. 13, 2004), available at ftp://www.leginfo.ea.gov/pub/03-04/bill/scn/sb_12511300/sb_1262_bill_20040213_introduced.pdf; see also Cal. AG Press Release, supra note 2, at 1
(describing the AG's reform proposal and its imminent introduction by Senator Sher).
22. See Cal. Act, supra note 1, passim.
23. See Todd Wallack, Nonprofits Fight Tougher Disclosure Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 2004,

at C3 (reporting that despite changes addressing some concerns of the nonprofit community, various
nonprofit groups remained opposed to the California Senate bill); Melanie Payne, Bill Would Order
Audits for Charities, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 13, 2004 (reporting similar concerns in response to the
California Senate bill), available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/business/v-print/story/8259982p9190611 c.html.
24. See S. 1262, 2004 Leg., 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (version passed by California Senate on
May 25, 2004), available at ftp://www.leginfoca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb 1251-1300/sb1 262-bi11_
20040524_amendcd_sen.pdf; S. 1262, 2004 Leg., 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (version passed by
California Assembly on August 25, 2004), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_1251 -1300/sb 1262_bill_20040823_amendedasm.pdf.
25. See Cal. Act, supra note 1.
26. See Anft & Williams, States Propose New Accountability Regulations for Nonprofit Groups,
supra note 2, at 8; Anfi & Williams, Redefining Good Governance, supra note 2, at 6; Jessi Hempel &
Amy Borrus, Now the Nonprofits Need Cleaning Up: Cozy Boardrooms at Colleges and Charities Face
IncreasingGovernment Scrutiny, BUS. WEEK, June 21, 2004, at 107; Stephanie Strom, Questions About
Some Charities' Activities Lead to a Pushfor Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at A23;
Bill Barnhart, Non-Profits Review Tried-and-True, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2003, § 5, at 3.
27. See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, CharitiesStart to Grade Themselves, WALL ST. J., Aug.

18, 2004, at Dl (noting the current legislative reform efforts in New York and California and stating
that "many more [states] are considering such measures"); National Council of Nonprofit Associations,
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other states' proposals do not match the scope of those in New York and
Massachusetts. 28 The California enactment is of considerable size, but most
of its contents are addressed to the state's charitable solicitation regime.
New Hampshire adopted legislation in 2004 increasing the scope of the
29
financial reporting required of financially large charitable organizations.
Other recent state bills, however, narrowly address only charitable solicita31
tion reform, 30 regulate only a confined subset of nonprofit organizations,

State Governance Proposals and Bills-2004 (described by NCNA's website as compiling state non-

profit governance reforms proposed "[i]n the wake of Congress' passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act"),
at http://www.ncna.org/_uploads/documents/live//State%20governance.doc (last updated Oct. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter NCNA Compilation]; PATRICE A. HEINZ, ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES
(MILWAUKEE, WIS.), RESPONDING TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: THE FINANCIAL
REPORTING PRACTICES OF NONPROFITS 9 (2003) (mentioning the interest of AGs in Ohio and Minnesota in pursuing such legislation as well), available at http://www.alliancet.org/Home/SOX-final-803.pdf.
28. A search of recent legislative proposals and enactments yielded what might broadly be termed
nonprofit legislative reform efforts in at least eighteen states. See S.B. 532, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala.
2004); S.B. 1066, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004); H.B 2514, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2004); S.B. 1193, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004); Cal. Act, supra note 1; H.B.5014, 2005 Gen.
Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); SB. 396, 2004 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2004); S.B. 1035,
2003 Gen.
Assem.,
Jan. Sess. (Conn.
2003) (original
version), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/tob/s/2003SB-01035-ROO-SB.htm; H.B. 5313, 2004 Gen. Assem., Feb.
Sess. (Conn. 2004); S.B. 2839, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2004); H.B. 2453, 80th Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2004); S.B. 2274, 80th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2004); L.D. 1691, 121st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2004) (codified in ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 9 §§ 5003-18 (West 2004)); Mass.
Draft Leg., supra note 1; H.B. 4234, 183d Gen. Ct., 2d Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2004); S.B. 1115, 92d Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004); H.B. 1769, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004); S.B. 1780, 83d Leg., Reg.
Sess, (Minn. 2004); H.B. 514, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004); H.B. 1408, 158th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.H. 2004) (codified in N-H.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:28, 7:32 (2004 Supp.)); N.Y. AG Program Bill 6805, supra note 17; N.Y. AG Program Bill 65-05, supranote 17; N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1; S. 7219,
226th Gen Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); A. 11292, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); A.
8568-B, 226th Gen. Assem., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); S.B. 153, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2003); H.B. 1019, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); H. 7962, 2004 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2004); 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws 330 (signed July 2, 2004); H.B. 3061, 115th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.
(S.C. 2003); 14.724, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 (West
2004). However, only the Massachusetts Draft Legislation, the New York Proposals, and, to a lesser
degree, the Revised New York Proposals provide a comprehensive set of reforms clearly patterned on
Sarbanes-Oxley. Most of the other legislation is more limited in scope or offers reform proposals
unlinked to the federal Act. Legislation considered in Alabama and enacted by the Iowa legislature
would broadly address nonprofit legal issues, but are adoptions of the Uniform Trust Code and Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, respectively, and thus do not suggest innovative or Sarbanes-Oxlcylinked reforms. See S.B. 532, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2004); H.B.2453, 80th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Iowa 2004); S.B. 2274, 80th Gen Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2004).
The National Council of Nonprofit Associations ("NCNA") provides a useful compilation of
state legislative reform proposals linked with Sarbanes-Oxley, including many of the proposals listed
here, on its website. See NCNA Compilation, supra note 27.
29. See H.B. 1408, 158th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2004) (codified in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 7:28(111-a-IIl-b)) (requiring charitable organizations with over $1 million in revenue, gains, or other
support to submit audited financial reports to the state AG along with their annual filings, and demanding filing charitable organizations with more than $500,000 in such support to submit unaudited financial reports).
30. See, e.g., S.B. 1066, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004); H.B. 2514, 46th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2004); S.B. 1115, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004).
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or impose new requirements only on organizations receiving or using public funds. 32 While certainly not equivalent in coverage to the comprehensive New York or Massachusetts efforts, these more limited proposals do
often introduce and rely on disclosure mechanisms, and will be discussed
when relevant.
B.

The U.S. Senate Shows Interest

In the summer of 2004, the U.S. Senate began to show renewed interest in nonprofit regulation as well. 33 The Senate Finance Committee held a
hearing on June 22 captioned "Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping
Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities." 34 In connection with this
hearing, the Committee released a bipartisan staff discussion draft (the
"White Paper") describing myriad potential charity reform proposals,
which would, if enacted, be implemented through the tax code. 35 Less than
two weeks after the public hearing, Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Charles Grassley issued a press release soliciting comments on the White
Paper and announcing an invitation-only Charitable Governance Roundta-

31. See, e.g., 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws 330 (signed July 2, 2004),
32. See, e.g., S.B. 153, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H. 724, 2004 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 (West 2004).
33. Prior to the hearing held in June 2004, the last time the U.S. Congress undertook significant
revisions to the regulation of tax-exempt entities was in 1996, when it enacted new excise tax remedies
to be levied upon insiders involved in self-dealing transactions with their tax-exempt public charities or
social welfare organizations. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000) (imposing the so-called "intermediate sanctions"). See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS: A GUIDE FOR

NONPROFITS (2003) (offering a comprehensive guide to the intermediate sanctions regulatory regime).
The last truly expansive effort atreform in this area may well have been in 1969, when Congress enacted a series of new provisions targeting perceived abuses by private foundations.
34. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities:
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004), available at

http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm.
35. The legislative proposals discussed in this Article variously address their reforms to nonprofit
corporations, charities, tax-exempt organizations, and other legal categories within the nonprofit sector.
In part, this is an outgrowth of the body of law each seeks to reform. For example, while the New York
efforts would reform only its statutes relating to not-for-profit corporations, the federal proposals would
revise the federal tax code's regulation of tax-exempt organizations. Charity denotes a group both more
and less inclusive than either of these terms. It refers to a group's charitable mission, regardless of
whether it is formed as a corporation, trust, or unincorporated association and regardless of whether it is
tax exempt. These categories can impact whether specific reforms apply to a particular organization.
See infra note 53. However, the analysis of the disclosure focus of the proposals presented here rarely
hinges on this categorization. Thus, for ease of reference, this Article generally will discuss the proposals holistically, as nonprofit reforms with an impact on nonprofit organizations and the nonprofit sector.
Other papers within this symposium offer helpful analysis of the many consequences of these
categories. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80

CHI.-KENT L. REv. 641 (2005) (analyzing the impact of legal form of organization on the substance of
nonprofit law); Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality,80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 613 (2005)
(addressing the overlapping regulatory and enforcement capacities of state AGs and the IRS).
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ble discussion of its proposals. 36 Many groups and individuals submitted
37
comments, and the Roundtable was held at the Senate on July 22, 2004.

The White Paper addresses many tax-specific abuses, but it also responds to general concerns about fraudulent practices and lackadaisical

oversight by nonprofit directors, officers, and managers. In this latter sense,
the federal and state reform initiatives share many similar substantive aims.
The breadth of the reform proposals and tactics described by the White

Paper dwarfs even the sweeping New York and Massachusetts initiatives.
Yet, the federal proposals share with their state counterparts a strong commitment to disclosure-based reform. The proposals contained in the White
Paper also obviously rest on the assertion that new legislation is the cure
for failures of monitoring and enforcement in the nonprofit sector, a position shared by state legislatures and attorneys general pressing nonprofit
reform.
The ultimate shape the Senate's nonprofit reform efforts will take re-

mains uncertain. Early on, Chairman Grassley stated that his Committee
was unlikely to bring forward a single reform bill encompassing all or most
of its proposals, 38 and the Committee provided few signals as to its priori-

ties. 39 In late September 2004, Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member
Max Baucus asked Independent Sector, a nonprofit umbrella group, "expeditiously" to convene a panel to analyze proposals for nonprofit reform on
the federal level, and to make final recommendations on their adoption by

36. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman,
Grassley Announces Charitable Governance Roundtable, Solicits White Papers for Discussion (July 2,
2004), available athttp://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prgO70204-pdf

37. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman,
Grassley Announces Participants, Releases White Papers for Charitable Governance Roundtable (July
21, 2004) (listing presenters and providing links to their submissions), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpressi2004/prgO72104d.pdf. The discussion included brief presentations from representatives of various parts of the nonprofit sector, as well as academics and attorneys,
and then proceeded to a general question and comment session, See Fred Stokeld, EO Reps Respond to
Finance Draft of Charity Reform Proposals, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 321 (2004) (describing the

session and reporting comments of various participants).
38. See Stokeld, supra note 37, at 322 (reporting Chairman Grassley's prediction that comprehensive legislation is unlikely).
39. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman,
Grassley Advances Crackdown on Car, Intellectual Property Donation Abuses (Oct. 6, 2004) (reporting
the inclusion in a near-final conference report of a provision intended to prevent abuse of deductions
available to taxpayers who donate cars and intellectual property to charity), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prgIO0604d.pdf; Fred Stokeld, Finance Staffer Praises
Proposed£O Reforms, 104 TAX NOTES 471 (2004) (reporting a staffer's comment that the Committee
would pursue proposals over the next year "as it gets comfortable with them," though a proposal addressing donor-advised fund reforms was likely in the near future).
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spring 2005.40 The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, organized by Independent Sector in response to this request, released its Interim Report to the
Senate Finance Committee and the public on March 1, 2005,41 and has
promised a Final Report later this spring. 42 Upon receipt of this Interim
Report, Senator Grassley announced that he hoped to hold a hearing on
43
these issues in the spring of 2005.
Virtually all of the current legislative proposals for nonprofit reform
remain in early form. Only time will tell whether these reform rumblings
will lead to substantial legislative changes. Still, their reliance on improving disclosure as a preferred tactic is evident and persistent, and should be
analyzed as a potential new starting point for regulatory thinking about
nonprofit reform. The remainder of this Article will explore these disclosure-based reform techniques and will consider whether and how they can
successfully be adapted to the unique context of the nonprofit sector.
II.

THE Focus ON DISCLOSURE

Throughout the recent state and federal proposals for nonprofit reform, legislatures have embraced a disclosure model of regulation. This
focus on disclosure takes several forms, and the individual proposals differ
widely in their details. Two major categories of these disclosure-based
reform measures, however, echo through various proposals. First, New
York, Massachusetts, and federal proposals have all at times included requirements that nonprofit officers certify the accuracy and reliability of

40. See Letter from Senators Charles E. Grassley & Max Baucus, Chairman and Ranking Member
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, to Diana Aviv, President and CEO of Independent Sector 2
(Sept. 22, 2004), availableat http://philanthropy.com/free/update2004/09/finance.pdf.
41. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SENATE

FINANCE COMMITTEE (Mar. 1, 2005), at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interimPanelReport.pdf [hereinafter NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT]. In January 2005, the staff of the congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation issued a report recommending many changes to improve compliance with
federal tax law and reform tax expenditures. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-02-05,
OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Jan. 27, 2005), at

http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf [hereinafter Joint Committee Report]. The Joint Committee Report
addresses myriad issues and includes a lengthy section of recommendations relating to exempt organizations. See id- at 220-332. In addition to proposing some novel changes, its recommendations echo
and amplify several suggestions first made in the White Paper. See id.
42. See Press Release, Independent Sector, Independent Sector Convenes National Panel on
Nonprofit Sector, (Oct. 12, 2004), at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/press/IndependentSectorConvenes.html.
43. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley,
News Conference with the Panel on the Nonprofit Section, Mar. I, 2005, at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg03005.pdf.
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their organizations' reports. 44 Second, proposals in various states and in the
White Paper would mandate increased use and oversight of disclosure
45
auditing.
The appeal of the disclosure model of regulation also can be seen in
federal and state proposals that extend beyond deployment of these two
common disclosure-based reform tactics. The White Paper contains a series
of reform initiatives aimed at increasing the quantity of disclosures that taxexempt nonprofit entities are required to produce. 46 It also would charge
the IRS with introducing an electronic filing system to help tax-exempt
filers and regulators better manage disclosed information. 47 In addition, a
few recent state proposals also have adapted disclosure mechanisms to
address traditional nonprofit enforcement priorities. 4 8 This Part will describe the use of each of these techniques in recent legislative proposals for
nonprofit reform and will demonstrate their common focus on disclosure.
A.

Officer Cerifi cation

Officer certification requirements are perhaps the reforms most frequently associated with Sarbanes-Oxley and post-Enron for-profit corporate reform. 4 9 Pursuant to the Act, the SEC promulgated regulations
obliging top officers of publicly-traded companies to sign their financial
reports, certifying the accuracy of the information these reports contain and
the reliability of the means used to create and maintain that information. 50
The efficacy of for-profit officer certification has been the subject of some
controversy among commentators, 51 but the assumption behind this re-

44. See infra Part II(A).
45. See infra Part 1(B).
46. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 1, at 1, 9 10 (proposing new mandatory quinquennial
filings to retain exempt status and the addition of new categories of disclosure on existing annual informational returns).
47. See id. at 9.
48. See infra Part II(C).
49. See, e.g., William Donaldson, Price of Change Will Pay Off in Long Term, BANKER, Nov.
2003, at 16; Steven Marlin, Absolutely Accountable, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 6, 2003, at 51; see also
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1200 (2003) (describing the function of the "highly publicized certification of the
financial statements required of the chief executive officer and chief financial officer").
50. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No- 107-204, § 302(a)(1)-(3), 116 Stat. 745, 777
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2000)) (instructing the SEC to require certification that the signing
officer has reviewed the report, the report does not contain material untruths, misstatements, or omissions, and the financial information in the report "fairly present[s] in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer"); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2004) (promulgating these
regulations).
51. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of
Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxey Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2002);
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quirement is obvious. It presumes that officer certification will improve the

accountability of publicly-traded companies because officers required to
sign will take personal responsibility for ensuring accurate and complete
disclosures, backed by reliable internal controls. 52 Further, these more accurate disclosures will be available for the SEC and investors to use to
prosecute perceived errors and abuses by the disclosing companies.
New York was the first to adapt the officer certification mechanism to
the nonprofit environment. This adaptation was relatively simple. New
York law already required nonprofits to produce various kinds of internal
and external reports; 53 the New York Proposals simply added a requirement that officers of incorporated nonprofits must certify the accuracy and
reliability of the internal reports their corporations must produce. The main
innovation in New York's adaptation was that the certification require54
ments varied, depending on the size of a nonprofit's assets or revenues.
For larger nonprofit corporations, the New York Proposals applied the
Sarbanes-Oxley accuracy and reliability certification requirements virtually
intact. The relevant provision required the president or CEO, as well as the

treasurer or CFO, to sign these internal reports, verifying the truth of the
information disclosed, the reliability of his or her nonprofit's internal controls, and that the officer has disclosed any deficiencies of these controls
and any relevant frauds to appropriate parties. 55 In financially smaller non-

profit corporations, only a looser accuracy certification would be required,
obliging the signing officer merely to verify that he or she has reviewed the
report and believes it fairly presents the financial position and operations of
Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate
Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989, 1003-05 (2003).
52. President George W. Bush's statement accompanying his signature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
also highlighted this role of the certification requirement- See President's Statement on Signing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOe. 1286 (July 30, 2002) ("The legislative
purpose of sections 302, 401, and 906 of the Act, relating to certification and accuracy of reports, is to
strengthen the existing corporate reporting system ... ").
53. Nonprofits incorporated under the state's Not-For-Profit Corporation Act must produce internal reports, "verified" by their officers, directors, or a financial professional. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW § 519(a) (McKinney 2001). Regardless of their form of organization, nonprofits that hold
charitable assets or that solicit charitable contributions are requircd to file annual reports with the state
attorney general- N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(d), (f), (r) (McKinney 2001) [hereinafter
N.Y. EPTL]; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 2001). However, the charitable solicitation regulation regime does except some rather broad categories of nonprofits from this requirement. See, e.g.,
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 172-a(l), (2)(a), (2)(g) (exempting religious organizations and many educational
institutions from filing requirements).
54. See N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § I(d); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 205,
250-58 (2004) (providing a comparison of the language employed by the New York Proposals and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
55. See N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note I, § I(e)(l)-(4).
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his or her organization. 56 The New York Proposals specifically declined to
create any new private rights of action against signing officers based on
57
their verifications.
Despite the New York AG's continuing commitment to enacting legislation to curb financial frauds in nonprofit organizations, his early enthusiasm for officer certification has cooled. The AG's legislative agenda for
nonprofit reform, as announced in March 2005, no longer includes accuracy or reliability certification requirements. 58 The Revised New York
Proposals do still attempt to ensure that nonprofits have adequate internal
financial controls, but use a more direct route to accomplish this goal. In a
new section, one of the AG's new bills would affirmatively mandate the
establishment and maintenance of such controls by all nonprofit corporations, regardless of size. 59 The Revised New York Proposals may mean
officer certification is unlikely to become law in that state. Yet, the original
New York Proposals' officer certification mechanism remains relevant, as
it has been and will remain an important model for other reform drafters.
The Massachusetts Draft Legislation imposes an officer certification
requirement quite like that of the early New York Proposals, but it requires
certification of annual financial reports filed by all public charities with the
60
state AG, rather than only internal reports of nonprofit corporations.
Again, this legislation provides differing levels of certification, depending
on the size of a nonprofit's assets, revenues, or both. 6 1 Officers of larger
organizations must certify both the accuracy and reliability of their reports,
including the existence and sufficiency of internal controls, and various
internal disclosures. 62 For smaller organizations, officers again need only
certify to accuracy, making general statements that they are familiar with
and trust the reports filed.63 Although it too declines to authorize new private rights of action against certifying officers, the Massachusetts draft

56. Id. § 1(d). Private foundations would be subject to slightly different reporting requirements, id.
§ (f), and nonprofits that neither hold charitable assets nor engage in charitable solicitation would be
entirely exempt from these enhanced verification provisions, id. § l(e)(5).
57. See id. § 1(h). Although no new private causes of action are provided, the New York Proposals would add to AGs' potential enforcement actions the right to sue officers in situations of "persistent" failures in reporting, in addition to the "willful" failures the AG may sue to address under current
law. See id. § 2. They also contain explicit authorization for the AG to seek such officers' removal in
court. See id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See
See
See
See
See
See

N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17; N.Y. AG Program Bill 65-05, supra note 17.
N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 6.
Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, §§ 2(3)-(4).
id. § 2.
id § 2(4).
id. § 2(3).
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does include a list of punishments the AG might pursue against officers
64
who make false certifications, including civil penalties and removal.
The federal White Paper also includes an officer certification proposal. Due to the Senate Finance Committee's (and the federal government's) limited jurisdiction in the field of nonprofit legislation, this
proposal appropriately focuses its certification approach on IRS filings

required of organizations granted exemption from federal income taxation. 65 The Committee's proposal would oblige the CEO or equivalent
officer of a tax-exempt entity to sign the entity's annual informational return-the Form 990-and by doing so to make two declarations. First, the
CEO would make an attestation of accuracy, declaring that he or she has
been reasonably assured of the accuracy and completeness of the Form
990.66 Second, the CEO's signature would act as a reliability certification,
reporting that he or she has established "processes and procedures to en-

sure" compliance with federal tax law. 67 Unlike the proposed state officer
certifications and some of the White Paper's own reform ideas in other
areas, the White Paper makes no distinction between CEOs' certification
responsibilities in large and small entities. 68 Furthermore, it contemplates
that "additional penalties could be brought against a CEO who signs the
69
return," presumably based on its inaccuracy.

64. See id.§ 5.
65. Both the states and the federal government exercise regulatory authority over nonprofit organizations. State attorneys general typically are charged with the responsibility to supervise charitable
assets and have standing to enforce the duties of nonprofit fiduciaries. The federal Internal Revenue
Service polices tax-exemption and deductibility of contributions, tax benefits available to eligible
nonprofit organizations and their donors. Although the state and federal spheres of authority are distinct
in concept, in practice their enforcement initiatives can overlap. This description is necessarily simplified. For in-depth discussions of the roles of the states and the federal government in regulating charities, see MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 301-427 (2004) and
Silber, supra note 35.
66. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 8. The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector convened by Independent Sector (the "Nonprofit Panel") also has recommended an accuracy certification requirement.
See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 20 (recommending an IRS requirement that
the highest ranking officer of a tax-exempt organization should sign its annual informational return and
"attest to the accuracy and completeness of its contents").
67. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 8. Although the Nonprofit Panel has not recommended a
reliability certification requirement, itsrecent Interim Report does note that reviewing the adoption and
implementation of internal financial controls is an important component of audit oversight. See
NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 20.
68. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 8. The Nonprofit Panel also recommends broad application
of its accuracy certification requirement to all organizations required to file the Form 990 series returns.
However, in its prefatory discussion of the guiding principles to improve accountability and governance
of charities, it notes that "[l]awmakers must consider the range of organizations to which regulations
may apply, and must refrain from adopting regulations where the costs of demonstrating compliance
outweigh the benefits gained." See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 16.
69. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 8. Rather than suggesting new penalties to be imposed on
organization managers, the Nonprofit Panel advocates greater enforcement of existing penalties for
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B.

Auditing

Those drafting recent legislative proposals for nonprofit reform also
demonstrate a striking faith in the ability of well-monitored outside auditors to improve the quality of nonprofit disclosures. One may trace some
roots of this reliance on auditors and audit committees to the SarbanesOxley Act, which adds new requirements for service on public company

audit committees 70 and assigns new responsibilities to audit committee
members. 7 1 However, in the context of publicly-traded companies, audited
financial reports were a requirement long before the Enron and other scandals of 2001,72 and audit committees became mandatory in order for com73
panies to list their shares on major national exchanges beginning in 1999.
In the nonprofit context, as indeed in the non-publicly-traded company
context, this level of auditing sophistication often cannot be assumed.
Therefore, the proposed nonprofit auditing reforms start at a more basic
level.
The auditing proposals separate into two basic categories: (1) initial
demands for the production of audited financial reports or requirements
that other, previously unaudited documents now be audited, and (2) mandates that organizations establish mechanisms for audit oversight. The New
Hampshire and California enactments require high revenue nonprofits to
begin producing audited annual financial reports. 74 In addition, California's
legislation compels nonprofit corporations of a requisite size to establish

officers' failures to file accurate and complete returns. See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra
note 41, at 20.
70. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(3)(A)-(B); see also id. §§ 201, 204 (imposing significant new
limitations on auditors as well).
71. See, e.g., id. § 202.
72. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-01 to 210.3-20
(2004) (describing the financial statements to be filed annually with the SEC by issuers and generally
requiring these statements to be audited).
73. See New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 303.01(A) (mandating that all
listed companies have a qualified audit committee), at http://www.nyse.com/Ilcn/1078416930873.html?enable=section&snumber=3&ssnumber=303.00 (last modified Dec. 20, 1999); The
Nasdaq Stock Market, Marketplace Rule 4350(d) (imposing a similar requirement for Nasdaq issuers),
at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer-asp?SelectedNode=4&FileName=/nasd/nasd-rules/RulesoftheAssociation..mg.xml#chp_14_15; see also J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § IIA.0313], at IIA-21 & n.90 (3d ed. 2004) (describing these developments).
74. See Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(1) (limiting application of this requirement to organizations
"that receive[] or accrue[] in any fiscal year gross revenue of two million dollars ($2,000,000) or
more"); H.B. 1408, 158th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2004) (codified in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28(Ill-aIll-b)) (requiring charitable organizations with over $1 million in revenue, gains or other support to
submit audited financial reports to the state AG along with their annual filings).
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audit committees. 75 Oftentimes, New York and Massachusetts law already
requires the organizations regulated under their reform proposals to pro76
duce audited reports; their proposals would retain these requirements.
Proposals in these states also would compel large nonprofits to create audit

committees and assign to them specific supervisory responsibilities. 7 7 The
state proposals requiring the establishment of audit committees all use
similar language to set qualifications for participation that prohibit financial
entanglement between committee members and their organizations. 78 Each
also tasks these committees with selecting outside auditors, setting their
79
compensation, and monitoring their performance.
75. Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2) (imposing an audit committee requirement on charitable
corporations with gross revenue of $2,000,000 or more in any fiscal year).
76. Massachusetts imposes an audit requirement on all nonreligious public charities, even if they
do not solicit contributions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 § 8F (West 2004) (requiring those
public charities that must file annual reports to the AG and that receive more than $100,000 in gross
support and revenue during a fiscal year to submit an audited financial statement together with this
annual report, although public charities receiving between $100,000 and $500,000 are permitted to
substitute a CPA's review report)- The Massachusetts proposal actually would decrease the number of
charities subject to its audit requirement by raising the threshold at which audited reports must be
submitted to the AG from $500,000 to $750,000 in annual receipts. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith,
Pillaging of Charitable Assets: Embezzlement and Fraud 27 (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) (describing this ironic turn of events). During its 2004 session, the Massachusetts legislature presumably agreed some relief from the requirement was necessary; it raised the trigger from
$250,000 to $500,000 without the involvement of the AG. See id.
New York's existing audit requirement is limited in application to nonprofits that engage in
solicitation of charitable contributions from the public. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(l), (2) (McKinney
Supp. 2004) (requiring those nonprofits that must register under its charitable solicitation law to file
annual audited financial reports if they receive gross revenue and support in excess of $250,000 annually or if they use professional fundraisers; nonprofits receiving in excess of $100,000 must file a
CPA's review report). Several other states also impose audit requirements on soliciting charities eaming
significant revenues. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-403(b)(1) (Lexis 2001) (demanding inclusion
of audited financial statements in annual filings by soliciting charities with gross revenues in excess of
$500,000); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-53.1-4(a) (2004) (requiring organizations registered to solicit
charitable contributions to file annual audited financial statements with the state if they have annual
gross income of more than $500,000).
77. See Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 3 (requiring audit committees in nonprofit corporations
with at least $750,000 of gross revenue and support in any fiscal year); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1,
§ 4(g)(1) (imposing an audit committee requirement on nonprofit corporations whose financial reports
are audited by a certified public accountant, that have at least $3 million in assets, or that receive at least
$1 million in gross revenue and support in any fiscal year, unless their articles of incorporation or
bylaws prohibit it). The Revised New York Proposals retain the auditing proposals of their predecessors
virtually intact. See N.Y. Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(g). The only substantive difference is a
change in the trigger point at which nonprofit corporations are instructed to appoint an audit committee.
Compare N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(g)(1) (using a $2 million revenue trigger),
with N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § 4(g)(1) (using a $1 million revenue or $3 million asset trigger).
78. See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(g)(3), N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1,
§ 4(g)(3); Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 3(3); Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2).
79. See Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2) (requiring the audit committee to recommend auditor
engagements and compensation to the full board and to oversee auditor performance); Mass. Draft Leg.,
supra note 1, § 3(2) (making audit committee members "directly responsible for the appointment,
compensation, and oversight" of independent auditors and accountants); N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05,
supra note 17, § 3(g)(2) (similar); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § 4(g)(2) (similar).
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The federal proposal also invokes auditing solutions, although it again
concentrates on requirements for tax forms and filings. It would require an
independent auditor to review all Form 990 submissions for conformity
with the standards for such filings; it also would require tax-exempt entities
to submit these auditor reports to the IRS along with their annual filings. 80
In addition, the federal proposal mandates a sliding scale of audit requirements for the financial reports of organizations above some minimum asset
size 8 and auditor rotation at least every five years. 82 Rather than assigning
audit oversight responsibilities to an audit committee, the White Paper
charges the board of each tax-exempt organization with the responsibility
to "review and approve the auditing and accounting principles and practices used in preparing the organization's financial statements and [to] retain and replace the organization's independent auditor." 83 In addition to
issuing this governance mandate, the federal proposal requires that each

exempt entity confirm its board's compliance with it on the Form 990.84
Unlike the state proposals and some other proposals in the White Paper,
this governance mandate and certification is not keyed to asset or revenue

size. But, the drafters note that "[r]elaxation of certain of these rules might
85
be appropriate for smaller tax exempt organizations."
New legislation in several other states also would require subsets of

nonprofit organizations to begin producing audited financial reports. However, one should not overstate the importance of these bills as evidence of a
sea change in nonprofit regulation. These mandates are not linked to gen-

eral nonprofit accountability reforms. They do not apply to all nonprofit or
tax-exempt organizations, or even to all incorporated nonprofits or non80. See White Paper, supra note I, at 9. The White Paper also proposes that these audit reports
should be maintained as public documents. See id.
at 9, 10-11.
81. See id. at 9 (requiring independent audits of the financial statements of tax-exempt organizations with greater than $250,000 in gross receipts and review of these statements by a CPA for organizations with gross receipts of greater than $100,000 but less than $250,000). The Nonprofit Panel
recommends somewhat higher triggers for requiring audited financial statements. See NONPROFIT
PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 23 (recommending that exempt filers with $2 million or
greater annual revenues be required to obtain audited financial reports and file them along with their
Form 990 series returns and that filers with annual revenues between $500,000 and $2 million should be
required to obtain an independent public accountant's review of their financial statements).
82. White Paper, supra note 1,at 9. Although the Nonprofit Panel agreed that nonprofits can
sometimes benefit from auditor rotation, and that large organizations should consider the practice, it did
not view an auditor rotation mandate as appropriate legislation. See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 41, at 25.
83. White Paper, supra note 1,at 12. In its
Interim Report, the Nonprofit Panel expressed its view
that audit oversight "is a critical responsibility of the board of directors," but did not approve of legislation mandating the form this oversight should take. See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra
note 41, at31.
84. White Paper, supra note 1,at 13.
85. Id.
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profits of a requisite size. For example, recent amendments to Maine's
charitable solicitation registration law add it to the growing list of states
requiring organizations registered to engage in such solicitations to include
an audited financial statement in their annual applications for renewal.86
Proposed legislation in Ohio would require organizations that receive more
than $500,000 of government funds in any calendar year to obtain an independent audit and file an audit report with the legislative arm of the government entity from which the funds were received. 87 These proposals are
part of more standard state regulation of the financial practices of organizations that hold donated or public funds, but they do reflect a now-familiar
focus on auditing to produce better nonprofit disclosures.
C.

Other Disclosure-BasedReforms

Various state and federal proposals for nonprofit legislative reform
also place a strong focus on disclosure in areas that extend beyond officer
certification and auditing requirements. The White Paper includes a series
of proposed reforms that would increase the quantity of information that
tax-exempt organizations must provide to the IRS regarding their practices,
relationships, and activities. It also endorses electronic filing for Forms 990
and proposes authorization to fund its implementation. 88 A few recent examples of state legislative reform also include disclosure requirements that
go beyond officer certification and auditing requirements. These efforts
tend to use disclosure to target or strengthen traditional areas of nonprofit
regulation.
The very first proposal the White Paper advances would increase the
volume and frequency of disclosures by tax-exempt entities by imposing a
new layer of periodic filing requirements. On each fifth anniversary of an
organization's initial qualification for exemption, it would be required to
file "such information as would enable the IRS to determine whether the
organization continues to be organized and operated exclusively for...

86. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 5004(4) (as amended March 2004).
87. See S.B. 153, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 9.23(C)-(D) (Oh. 2003-2004). A legislative

initiative in Vermont and a recent enactment in West Virginia also address the issue of nonprofits'
accountability for public funds they receive. See H. 724, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2004)
(requiring a public official, the auditor of accounts, "to collect and review biennially audits or financial
statements" of nonprofit organizations receiving government funds, for report to the state legislature);
W. VA.CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 (West 2004) (enacted in 2004 to add penalties for noncompliance to

existing mandate that organizations receiving $15,000 or more in state funds or grants must file CPAconducted audits of disbursements of funds with the legislature).

88. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 9, 10-11; see also infra text accompanying notes 159-161,
167-168 (describing the White Paper's plans to fund its e-filing and other initiatives).
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exempt purposes." 89 The White Paper suggests that such filings would
include some materials readily available to many organizations, such as
current copies of the organization's governing documents and financial
statements. 90 However, it also would demand that tax-exempt entities submit various organizational policies and a detailed narrative about the organization's practices, which many nonprofits would have to produce
specially for this purpose. 9 1 This information would be used in at least two
ways. It could be used by the IRS at its discretion to review the continued

validity of the organization's exemption, and it would be made publicly
92

available.
The White Paper also seeks to increase the depth of disclosures de-

manded of tax-exempt entities by expanding the existing Form 990. One
proposal would require new attachments to the Form 990 to disclose rela-

tionships among exempt and non-exempt organizations, transactions between such entities, and insider transactions of various kinds. 93 Another
proposal would expand the Form 990 to require larger exempt organizations to include detailed descriptions of their annual performance goals and
measurements for meeting such goals in current and future years. 94 The

White Paper explains that expanding the coverage of this publicly available
form will "assist donors to better determine an organization's accomplishments and goals in deciding whether to donate, and not [to provide] a point
of review by the IRS." 95 The federal proposals also emphasize the need for

Forms 990 from all exempt organizations to include accurate financial and

89. White Paper, supra note 1,at 1.Failure to comply with this quinquennial filing requirement
would result in loss of exemption. Id. The Nonprofit Panel did not address this proposed new filing
requirement in its Interim Report, but expressed its intent to do so in the future. See NONPROFIT PANEL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 51-52.
90. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 1.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9-10. The Nonprofit Panel has noted the "need for revision and reform of the Form 990
series returns to ensure accurate, complete, timely, consistent and informative reporting" and signaled
its intent to provide guidance on revisions to these forms in a future report. See NONPROFIT PANEL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 22.
94. White Paper, supra note 1,at 10 (suggesting application of this requirement only to those taxexempt entities over $250,000 in gross receipts). The Nonprofit Panel reserved the question of performance data disclosure for its next phase of work. See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41,
at 52.
95. White Paper, supra note I, at 10.
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other disclosures 96 and back up their new requirements for disclosure to the
97
IRS with increased penalties.
In addition to these provisions increasing the disclosure outputs that
tax-exempt entities must prepare and file, the White Paper proposes a substantial innovation in the IRS' system for managing the documents it receives. First, it would authorize the IRS to mandate that tax-exempt entities
file electronically. 98 In addition, the White Paper instructs the IRS to prepare itself to receive and capture electronically-filed information on a swift
timetable and to coordinate with state officials to share information and
simplify reporting. 99 The IRS just last year began to accept electronic
Forms 990 and other disclosure documents filed by tax-exempt entities on a
voluntary basis. 10 0 It has historically collected these materials only in paper
format, information from which can be distilled and screened only by an
arduous manual process. Authorization for the IRS to require electronic
filing and to institute systems to manage the data contained in these files
could radically change the ability of the Service to analyze the information
it receives. State regulators similarly lack the ability to electronically cap-

ture and screen information from disclosure documents. 10 1 Instructing the
IRS to share information with states and to work with them to streamline
the reporting process may spur improvements in these systems as well,

particularly if funding for these purposes is made available to the IRS and
the states.
96. See id. (requiring exempt organizations to "disclose material changes in activities, operations
or structure" and to "accurately report the charity's expenses, including any joint cost allocations, in its

financial statements and Form 990").
97. See id. at 8-9 (adding a third, highest tier to the current two-tiered penalty structure for failure
to file complete and accurate Forms 990, and increasing the dollar amounts of various existing penalties
for filing failures and delays). As noted supra note 69, the Nonprofit Panel has recommended that the
IRS increase enforcement of existing penalties for filing failures, rather than the enactment of additional
penalties.
98. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 9. The Nonprofit Panel has come out strongly in support of
mandatory electronic filing, so long as appropriate provisions are made to allow filing of necessary
attachments and to ease filing for organizations of all sizes and resource levels. See NONPROFIT PANEL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 21.

99. See White Paper, supra note 1,at 9 (demanding the IRS obtain electronic capture capability by
January 1, 2007).
100. See Internal Revenue Service, E-File for Charities and Non-Profits (describing the newly
available electronic filing process for Forms 990 and selected other tax-exempt filings), at
http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=10821 1,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); see also ZINA POLETZ
ET AL., URBAN INST., CHARITIES READY AND WILLING TO E-FILE (June 2002) (reporting the findings of

a survey on tax-exempt organizations' capacity to adopt electronic filing), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410524.pdf.
101. See, e.g., William Josephson, Remarks at the Funders Alliance of Upstate New York 3 (Sept.
30, 2003) (draft of remarks dated Sept. 18, 2003 on file with author) (describing the automation of the
47,000 registrations and annual report files held by the New York Charities Bureau to be one of his
goals as its Assistant Attorney General-in-Charge); see also NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra

note 41, at 21 (recommending that federal and state e-filing efforts be coordinated).
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Finally, two recent state proposals for nonprofit legislative reform
suggest further potential expansion of disclosure requirements. Recent bills
in the Connecticut General Assembly would take disclosure to the extreme.
These bills would require organizations that solicit charitable contributions
to file with the state's consumer protection department not only annual
financial reports, but also detailed quarterly reports. 102 Moreover, the
House bill would require these reports to include a description of each
check that a soliciting organization issued in the preceding quarter. 103 This
excess of zeal may be due to legislators' overwhelming concerns regarding
charitable solicitation fraud and the use of professional fundraisers; 104 the
quarterly reporting requirements are but one small part of a larger bill updating the state's solicitation regime. Still, the Connecticut bills' use of
disclosure mechanisms at this level of detail is remarkable.
A bill recently before the Minnesota House of Representatives likewise would add a disclosure requirement to address a hot-button nonprofit
issue: excessive compensation. Current Minnesota law requires a nonprofit
organization that solicits charitable contributions to file a financial statement with state authorities, listing information on its five highest paid directors, officers, and employees receiving compensation in excess of
$50,000. 105 The new bill targets compensation increases. If the compensation of any one of the individuals listed on such a statement has increased
by more than five percent since the last statement filed, the bill would require the organization to disclose its reasons for increasing that compensation.1 06 Although it is common for nonprofit regulators to focus on
compensation and other self-dealing concerns, this reliance on increased
disclosure as a way to target excessive compensation is noteworthy.
The reform efforts described in this Part pursue nonprofit accountability through a variety of disclosure tactics. Officer certification mandates
charge fiduciaries with responsibility for improving nonprofit disclosure

102.
Assem-,
103.
104.

See H.B. 5313 § l(f), 2004 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2004); S.B. 396 § 2(f), 2004 Gen.
Feb. Sess, (Conn. 2004).
See Conn. H.B. 5313 § )(f).
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 54, at 235-40 (discussing AG's emphasis of donor protection

in their nonprofit enforcement agendas); see also Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 947 & n.37 (2004) (noting a 1994

survey's finding that state attorneys general perceive charitable solicitation fraud as their "biggest
problem" in the nonprofit enforcement context); Stephanie Strom, New Equationfor Charities:More
Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at FI ("Most states look at charity oversight as an
extension of their role as consumer watchdogs and focus on [charitable] solicitation.").
105.

See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.53(3) (West 2004).

106. See H.F. 1769 § 1(3)(i), 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).
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documents and the means by which the information disclosed is produced.
Auditing oversight mandates likewise engage fiduciaries in the process of
safeguarding the integrity of the nonprofit disclosure process. The additional requirements for disclosure auditing seek to harness the expertise of
accounting professionals to improve the data and presentation in nonprofit
disclosures. Various state and federal proposals would further increase
nonprofit disclosure output. And, electronic filing and other efforts to improve the accessibility of nonprofit disclosures attempt to make it easier for
regulators and the public to use the disclosures that nonprofits produce and
disseminate. Having established the contours of these reforms, the next Part
turns to evaluating the likely efficacy of their disclosure techniques in actually improving nonprofit accountability.
111. DISCLOSURE-BASED REFORMS AND NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY

Requiring disclosure can lead to improvements in an organization's
accountability by two distinct, though interactive, paths. First, disclosure
can improve accountability by spurring behavioral changes within the disclosing organization. In the nonprofit context, this path from disclosure to
accountability assumes that when nonprofit organizations and actors know
their errors and abuses will be disclosed, they will do more to avoid them.
Second, disclosure also can improve accountability by facilitating enforcement-by providing information to parties able to monitor, prevent, or
correct mistakes and misbehavior within a disclosing organization. For
nonprofits to move along this path from disclosure to accountability, disclosure reforms must improve the ability of the existing government and
private enforcers to target and prosecute abuses. Finally, of course, these
two paths can be interrelated. If nonprofit actors believe it is unlikely that
required disclosures will be used to facilitate enforcement efforts, this
knowledge will undermine their motivation to improve their behavior in
response to a disclosure mandate. This Part evaluates the ability of the
various disclosure-based reform proposals described above to move nonprofits toward greater accountability, along either of these paths. 107

107. It is important to note that, even if successful, the disclosure tactics found in recent state and
federal legislative proposals for nonprofit reform only really offcr to improve nonprofits' financial
accountability. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 54, at 234-68. This financial dimension of nonprofit
accountability-concerned with safeguarding nonprofit assets and the interests of their donors-is
certainly important. To be truly accountable, though, nonprofits also must be faithful to their missions
and must operate in accordance with the internal rules of governance they have adopted. See id. at 20919. Disclosure reforms aimed at financial accountability, even if they succeed, can only be a partial
solution to resolving the nonprofit sector's accountability gap.
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The disclosure focus of Sarbanes-Oxley, and its reliance on officer
certification and increased auditing to improve the accountability of the
entities it regulates, can easily be understood as appropriate to its historical
and legal context. The Act primarily regulates issuers of publicly-traded
securities. American securities regulation has been deeply committed to a
disclosure model since the inception of federal securities regulation in the
1930s. 10 8 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley was a response aimed to correct what
108. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 73, § 2.01, at 2-4 to 2-6 (explaining that the Securities Act of
1933 "embraced the disclosure philosophy," and that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 made the
importance of disclosure "unmistakably clear").
Of course, even in the corporate securities context, the viability of disclosure as a regulatory
mechanism has long been the subject of considerable debate. At the time of the federal securities laws'
enactment, even their boosters recognized that disclosure might not suffice to protect investors, especially unsophisticated ones. See, e.g., George J. Feldman, The New Federal Securities Act, 14 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1934) (supporting the new Securities Act, while still noting that "the holder of the security is
not completely protected even if the Act be effective and the security comes into his hands without any
fraud or misrepresentation"); Chester Rohrlich, The New Deal in CorporationLaw, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
1167, 1172 (1935) (stating that although one can assume even small investors eventually will learn of
relevant facts through disclosure, "there still lurks the danger of vital information being concealed from
the untrained and inexperienced by a judicious telling of the literal truth"). Despite these concerns,
however, the regulatory tool of disclosure maintained widespread approval for decades. See e.g., Robert
L. Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 623-31, 646 (1964) (asserting that, at least in normal times, disclosure-based regulation of initial securities offerings has effectively safeguarded investors and that extending and standardizing disclosure obligations would provide
even greater protection). Some commentators even suggested new types of information that issuers
might usefully be asked to disclose to regulators. See, e.g., Knauss, supra, at 646-48 (noting the potential use of securities disclosure regulations to promote corporate social responsibility); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between CorporateDisclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORD.
L. REV. 565, 587-88 (1972) (advocating new categories of disclosure, such as environmental activities,
hiring practices, and political contributions).
When Congress extended the range of required disclosures under the federal securities laws in
the 1960s, however, rumblings of discontent with mandatory disclosure policy began to emerge. See
George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 BUS. LAW. 721, 730 (1964) (concluding that his "studies suggest that the S.E.C. registration requirements had no important effect on the
quality of new securities sold to the public"); George J. Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under
the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MtAMI L. REV. 1471, 1480-82
(1979) (questioning the value and desirability of disclosure-based securities regulation and arguing
against its extension to demand continuous corporate reporting). But see Joel Seligman, The Historical
Needfor a Mandatory CorporateDisclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1983) (arguing these and other
critics of the mandatory corporate disclosure system have not properly accounted for concrete evidence
validating the disclosure system). Debate over disclosure's efficacy continued through the late 1990s,
when critics and scholars began considering possible alternatives. Compare, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter,
TowardDisclosureChoice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. I (proposing a regime in
which issuers could opt to provide their own preferred level of disclosure), and Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998)
(proposing a market-based, competitive federalism approach, in which states would compete with the
federal government for the power to regulate issuers' securities and issuers would choose which regime
applied to them by selecting a "securities domicile"), with Merritt B. Fox, RetainingMandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L_ REV. 1335, 1337 (1999)
(arguing that allowing U.S. issuers to select their own disclosure regimes in lieu of imposing mandatory
disclosure would not lead to socially optimal rates of disclosure).
With the explosion of corporate scandals at the turn of the current century, however, the
disclosure debate recently has turned from the question of whether to retain a mandatory securities
disclosure system to that of how best to use this regulatory tool. See, e.g., Edward Rock, Securities
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were perceived as gross inaccuracies in reporting by Enron and others,
inaccuracies that were not adequately prevented by the existing disclosurebased system.
Nonprofit regulation, by contrast, has not traditionally relied predominantly on a disclosure model. Enforcement occurs through investigation
and litigation by state AGs, IRS auditing and prosecution, and negotiation
of settlement agreements by both state and federal authorities. Nonprofit
organizations have long been required to make various disclosures to these
authorities, 109 and investigations and prosecutions may sometimes be triggered by revelations gained through review of nonprofit disclosure documents. But, nonprofit regulators also rely heavily on tips from insiders and
the public, as well as the findings of investigative journalists. 110 Before a
shift to disclosure as a significant, if not dominant, regulatory technique in
the nonprofit sector can legitimately be advocated, the potential for disclosure methods to achieve nonprofit accountability gains should be
demonstrated.
A.

Improving Behavior

The recent state and federal proposals for disclosure-based nonprofit
reform surely intend to work, at least in part, by improving behavior within
nonprofit organizations. This subpart assesses the extent to which these
disclosure enhancements are likely to improve the behavior of nonprofit
actors and organizations. It highlights the sometimes duplicative nature of
these proposals, their reliance on nonprofit actors' inclination to comply
with the law, and the costs of their implementation. These costs are particularly important in the unique nonprofit environment, where losses often
will be borne by vulnerable beneficiaries and by society at large.

Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOzo L.

REV. 675 (2002) (supporting the current system of mandatory disclosure as mechanism by which
issuers can make "credible commitments" to ongoing and indefinite disclosure, which is vital in order
to raise capital); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequencesfor
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (arguing that mandatory disclosure may be improved by researching how investors and experts use disclosed information, and cautioning that due to
"information overload" more disclosure is not always better); Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for
Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004) (arguing
that public companies should be required to disclose more management information, in order to make

mandatory disclosure requirements more effective).
109. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 65, at 311-17 (describingthe advent of state registration and

reporting requirements for nonprofits under adoptions of the Uniform Act for Supervision of Trustees
for Charitable Purposes and similar state legislation beginning in the 1950s).

110. See Brody, supra note 104, at 953 & n.60.
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1.

Officer Certifications

In order to analyze the ability of officer certification requirements to
improve nonprofit behavior, it is helpful to separate the accuracy and reliability certifications that recent reforms proposals include. Again, accuracy
certifications require nonprofit officers to take personal responsibility for
the truth of the contents of nonprofit disclosures, however that information
might be produced and whoever might ultimately see it. These reforms rely
on the integrity and conscientiousness of nonprofit officers to ensure the
quality of disclosed information. Reliability certifications focus less on
promises and more on process. They work by stimulating improvement of
the process by which disclosed information is produced and maintained.
These techniques differ in their ability to encourage improvements in the
behavior of nonprofit organizations and actors.
a.

Accuracy CertificationRequirements

On the surface, it seems hard to quarrel with the imposition of accuracy certification requirements. Surely high-level nonprofit officers should
believe in the verity of their entities' internal and external financial reports
and their IRS filings. However, to evaluate the usefulness of the accuracy
certification in improving nonprofit behavior, one must ask a harder question than whether nonprofit officers should believe their reports. Instead,
one must question whether officers required to make accuracy certifications
will be more likely than otherwise to cure defects in their disclosure processes and to resolve any underlying problems in their organizations' operations their disclosures might reveal. And, one should assess whether the
benefits of those cures and resolutions will be worth their costs. Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are murky.
In the first place, accuracy certification proposals may do little to improve nonprofit behavior because they often will replicate existing statutory
and regulatory requirements. Mandatory annual filings with state AGs already frequently require signatures by nonprofit officers and/or trustees,
attesting to their belief in the correctness and comprehensiveness of the
information submitted. 11I Indeed, the very states that have considered accuracy certification reforms, New York and Massachusetts, currently have

11. See, e.g., Attorney General Lisa Madigan, State of Illinois, Form AG990-IL, Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Report (requiring signatures of the president or trustee and treasurer or trustee
certifying that they have examined the information in the report "and the facts therein stated are true
and complete").
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these requirements. 1 12 Likewise, the Form 990 cannot be filed without an
officer's signature, which attests to the verity of the information provided. 113 It is difficult to imagine nonprofit officers will change their behavior in response to a proliferation of duplicative accuracy certification
requirements.
Moreover, the extent to which any accuracy certification requirement
can improve the behavior of nonprofit organizations and actors is premised
on the assumption that certify'ing officers will be unwilling to sign falsely
or carelessly. However, mandated accuracy certifications will not deter
willfully abusive nonprofit actors. 114 Imagine an officer who is siphoning
off assets from a tax-exempt, nonprofit entity or who is taking truly excessive compensation. This officer already is transgressing federal tax law,
state fiduciary law, and perhaps even criminal law prohibitions. One must
doubt she will be more likely to disclose or cease this activity out of fear
that she will run afoul of a certification requirement if she reports inaccurately. It seems especially unlikely that our faithless officer will improve
her behavior if the likelihood of detection of her abuse and enforcement of
her fiduciary duty is (or is perceived to be) quite low. 115 Enforcement of
fiduciary duty by state and federal regulators is indeed quite limited, as is
the ability of the public to discipline the behavior of nonprofit actors and
organizations. 116

112. See Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, Division of Public Charities, Form PC
(annual reporting form requiring the president or other authorized officer or trustee to sign, declaring
under penalty of perjury "that the information furnished in this report... is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge"), available at http://www.ago-state.ma.us/filelibrary/main-pc.pdf (last visited Feb.
25, 2005); State of New York, Department of Law, Charities Bureau-Registration Section, Form
CHAR010 (providing an example of the certification required by officer(s) submitting filings to the
New York attorney general, which certification attests that the officer(s) examined the information
submitted and "to the best of my (our) knowledge and belief the contents thereof are true, correct and
complete"), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/forms/charO0l.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).
113. See Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax (requiring signature of officer, under penalties of perjury, denoting that the
officer has examined the form and that all of the information reported in it is "true, correct, and complete"), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
114. Cf MARION R_ FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 456 (1965) ("Individuals

whose acts are unequivocally mala fides can file incomplete or even false reports. The imposition of a
duty to account is not designed to uncover these acts. They require investigation, audits, and alert
enforcement.").
115. See Edward K. Cheng, Fiat Versus Structure: Music Piracy, Speeding & the Regulation of
Behavior 26-27 (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (collecting studies demonstrating
that the deterrent effect of prohibitions, even those with severe penalties, "falls rapidly (and nonlinearly) with lower probabilities of enforcement," and identifying possible sociological and cognitive
explanations for this finding).
116. For a discussion of the acute resource and structural impediments to nonprofit enforcement,
see infra Part IIl(B).
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Furthermore, it is not necessary to portray our hypothetical officer as
thieving or disloyal in order to predict that accuracy certifications will not
spur significant improvements in behavior. In the absence of clear and effective penalties for noncompliance, a nonprofit officer envisioned as a
Holmesian "bad man"--who follows only law that predictably will be enforced against him--likewise would not change his behavior in response to
accuracy certifications requirements. 1' 7 Thus, in the low enforcement environment of the nonprofit sector, accuracy certification requirements are not
likely to spur improved behavior either by those officers intent on or complicit in abuse or by those officers who refuse to follow unenforced or underenforced legal mandates.
Still, one would think that non-duplicative accuracy certification requirements at least would improve the behavior of those officers who nevertheless feel obligated to comply with the law as enacted. We can call
these officers "compliant officers," and the argument would proceed as
follows. Conscientious compliant officers concerned about making false
certifications would improve their monitoring of organizational operations
and employee and fiduciary conduct. New accuracy certification requirements also would focus otherwise lackadaisical compliant officers on the
data contained in their reports and would motivate those officers to scrutinize their filings more closely. Taking these steps would enable compliant
officers to find and correct mistakes or abuses within their own organizations. And, these improvements in behavior would thereby improve nonprofit accountability.
The problem with this argument, however, is that even compliant officers will limit the expenditures they make to support their accuracy certifications. All other things being equal, compliant officers would obtain all
possible assurances to support their certifications of accuracy and correct
any mistakes or abuses unearthed in the process of obtaining those assurances prior to signing reports or filings. But, all other things are not equal.
The hours and resources that might be spent to provide officers with the
assurances to support an accuracy certification must come from somewhere, presumably from the time and funds nonprofits can expend in pursuit of their missions. If he is also rational, a compliant officer will evaluate
the costs and benefits of devoting time and funds to establishing the accuracy of his organization's reports. In light of the paucity of penalties for

117. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897) (arguing that
to know the content of the law, one need only think of the law as would a "bad man," who views the
content of the law only as that which the courts predictably will punish). I thank Professor Harvey Dale
for this insight.

CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol 80:559

failures in accuracy certifications provided by the proposals and the general
lack of effective enforcement in the nonprofit area, 118 even a compliant
officer is likely to see a significant portion of his organization's resources
as better spent on its programs than on pursuing assurances to support an
accuracy certification. Thus, even in the subgroup of compliant officers,
improvements in behavior spurred by accuracy certification requirements
will be limited.
Furthermore, even limited efforts to comply with accuracy certification requirements will exact costs on nonprofits and their beneficiaries.
Nonprofit organizations often provide vital services that the market and
government will not or cannot provide. 119 If the burdens of compliance
with regulation push nonprofits to scale back their programs or force them
out of existence, beneficiaries, communities, and society will bear a real
loss. In addition to reducing resources available for mission achievement,
all officer certification requirements may diminish the human resources
made available to nonprofit organizations by hindering officer recruitment.
Qualified candidates who would otherwise choose to work for nonprofits
may opt not to do so if such positions become mired in legal compliance, or
in order to avoid any lingering potential for personal responsibility for inaccurate disclosure. 120 Neither nonprofit managers nor law reformers
should lightly brush aside these costs of new disclosure mandates.
The state reform proposals including accuracy certification requirements demonstrate an awareness of the new burdens these requirements
will impose on nonprofits by keying application of these requirements to
revenue or asset size. The trigger points vary, 121 and surely these facts will

118. See infra
Part l1(B).
119. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835, 843-45 (1980)
(explaining the existence of nonprofit organizations as a means to solving contract failures, where
consumers lack the information and expertise to compare, bargain, and evaluate complex services);
Dennis R. Young, Government FailureTheory, in THE NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 190, 19091 (J. Steven Ott ed., 2001) (explaining that nonprofits also step in where government production is
ineffective, due tothe constraints of majority decision making, the universal access imperative, and the
problems of government bureaucracy).
120, See Szymanski, supra note 11, at 1316-17 (addressing concerns regarding officer and director
recruitment raised by application of Sarbanes-Oxley-type reforms to nonprofits); see also Pamela Yip &
Terry Maxon, CEOs Spending Less Time at the Top, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 19, 2004, at ID
(identifying Sarbanes-Oxley's for-profit certification requirements as part of a backlash against CEOs
that may result in shorter CEO tenures, but noting that for-profit CEO salaries remain high). But see
also Bruce Meyerson, A Shortage of "Qualified" Directors? Maybe Companies Aren't Looking Hard
Enough, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 2004, at D2 (challenging claims that the pool of interested and qualified directors will shrink due to legal and regulatory changes adopted in response to
corporate scandals, and encouraging companies to look beyond "the corporate establishment")121. Compare, e.g., Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 2(4) (imposing its most stringent accuracy
certification requirement on nonprofit corporations that receive or accrue in any fiscal year gross revenue and support of atleast $750,000), with, e.g., N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § I(e) (imposing its
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not always indicate an individual organization's ability to absorb the costs
of compliance. But, the states' attentiveness to finding some method by

which to balance the burdens and benefits of accuracy certification reforms
is promising. The federal proposal does not presently calibrate its accuracy
certification proposal in this way, but its use of financial triggers in other
contexts suggests that this might be modified on further articulation.
b.

Reliability CertificationRequirements

In addition to accuracy certifications, the New York Proposals, Mas-

sachusetts Draft Legislation, and federal White Paper all would require
officers of nonprofit organizations to certify the reliability of the processes
that produce and safeguard the information they disclose. 122 Unlike the

accuracy certification proposals, these proposals are entirely novel and
would impose new disclosure burdens on nonprofit actors. They also can
have a somewhat different impact on nonprofit behavior. To appreciate this
distinction, it is important to understand somewhat more about the content
of these requirements.

Reliability certification requirements force nonprofit officers and their
organizations to confront the issue of internal controls. The New York Proposals took the relevant provision almost directly from Sarbanes-Oxley,

requiring officers of large-asset nonprofits to verify the existence and effectiveness of their "internal financial controls."' 123 The Massachusetts pro-

posal would require signing officers of large organizations to certify the
establishment and maintenance of two types of internal controls, "disclosure controls" and "internal control over financial reporting."'1 24 The

lengthy definitions of these terms include requirements for the process by

125
which controls should be developed and used, as well as their substance.
In its reliability certification proposal, the White Paper would mandate that

most stringent accuracy certification requirement on nonprofit corporations with at least $3 million in
assets or that receive or accrue gross revenue and support of at least $1 million in any fiscal year).
122. See Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 2(4); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § 1(e)(2)--(4);
White Paper, supra note 1, at 8.
123. N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § l(e)(2)-(4). Compare id., with Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 302(a)(4XA)-(B) (requiring certifications as to the existence and accuracy of "internal controls" in
substantially similar form to the New York Proposal's certification requirements as to "internal financial controls"), and id § 302(a)(4)(C)-(D) (mandating that officers evaluate their companies' internal
controls and present conclusions as to their efficacy, again in a form substantively identical to verifications required in the New York Proposals).
As noted above, the most recent legislative proposal from the New York AG removes the
reliability certification requirement, while retaining a focus on internal controls. This new approach is
addressed, infra, at text accompanying notes 128-30.
124. Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, §§ 1, 2(4).
125. See id. § I.
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CEOs of exempt organizations "sign a declaration under penalties of perjury that the chief executive officer has put in place processes and procedures to ensure that the organization's Federal information return and tax
return (including Form 990T) complies with the Internal Revenue
Code." 126 Rather than merely asking for assurances of accuracy, these reforms draft the signing officer into the process of designing methods to
27
produce information and protect its integrity-internal controls.1
Although the New York AG's most recent legislative proposals have
abandoned reliability certification, they retain an emphasis on internal controls. The Revised New York Proposals instruct foreign and domestic notfor-profit corporations to: "maintain internal financial controls designed to
reasonably ensure that material financial information relating to the corporation is made known to the corporation's board of directors by others
within the corporation." 12 8 Rather than triggering this requirement at any
particular level of assets or revenues, the Revised New York Proposals
would require nonprofits of all sizes to adopt internal controls, but only
those controls that would be reasonable. The provision goes on to impose
obligations on officers to disclose to the audit committee or board of directors any deficiencies in these internal controls, any frauds by employees
with a significant role in maintaining them, and any material information
indicating a problem with the financial and operational information disclosed in the organization's reports. 129 The substance of this internal controls mandate is quite similar to that of the New York Proposals' original
reliability certification requirement.13 However, officers operating under
the Revised New York Proposals would not be subject to the additional
requirement to certify their actions. Thus, the Revised New York Propos-

126. White Paper, supra note 1, at 8. The Senate Finance Committee staff cites another piece of
for-profit legislation, rather than Sarbanes-Oxley, as an analogue to its certification proposals. According to the draft, the JOBS bill would require taxable corporation CEOs to make a similar attestation on
their corporate tax returns. Id.
127. The New York Proposals also would involve the audit committee in maintaining internal
controls. See N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, §§ l(e)(4), 4(g)(4) (requiring audit committees to receive
reports of failures in internal controls from officers signing required certifications and from accounting
professionals engaged in audit functions). New York and Massachusetts both would rely on whistleblowers' reports to audit committees to flush out internal control gaps, See id. § 4(g)(4) (charging the
audit committee to create a process for receiving complaints regarding accounting, accounting controls,
auditing, and other financial matters); Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 3(4)-(5) (requiring audit committees to establish procedures to receive, retain, and treat these complaints, and instructing them to
forward such complaints to the attorney general at least annually).
128. See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 6(a)- The bill, like its predecessors, exempts membership organizations that do not solicit charitable contributions, as well as religious organizations, from its internal controls requirements. See id. §§ 6(c), 7.
129. See id. § 6(b).
130. Compareid. § 6, with N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, §§ (e)(2)-(4).
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als' affirmative mandate seeks to accomplish by direct instruction what
reliability certification would achieve as a more indirect effect.
The direct approach is certainly more efficient regulation and would
slightly reduce the paperwork burden on nonprofits attempting to comply.
More importantly, however, the focus of both reliability certification and
internal controls mandates on the disclosure process, rather than merely on
disclosure outputs, increases the likelihood that these measures can improve the behavior of nonprofit actors and organizations. Still, the ultimate
effectiveness of either technique remains linked to the questions whether
and to what extent nonprofit organizations will adopt and maintain internal
controls in response to their directives.
The first challenge for nonprofit organizations and officers subject to
reliability certification and other internal controls mandates will be to design and maintain internal controls. In the for-profit arena, internal control
31
has become a term of art with a more or less established meaning.1 It will
take time for government actors and the nonprofit sector to develop consensus around the baseline level of processes and procedures appropriate to
provide reasonable assurances of the accuracy and completeness of nonprofit financial reports or IRS filings. 132 Some of this work is beginning to
be undertaken. For example, the Massachusetts reform proposal provides a
definition of internal controls.133 According to the draft:
"internal control over financial reporting"... includes those policies and
procedures that: (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the public charity; (2) provide reasonable assurance that
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
and that receipts and expenditures of the public charity are being made
only in accordance with authorizations of the management, directors
and/or trustees of the public charity; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisi-

131. See MICHAEL RAMOS, HOW TO COMPLY WITH SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404, at 29-61
(2004) (providing a thorough review of the internal control concept and its application in for-profit

corporations).
132. See Letter from Carolyn Patterson, Chairperson, Alliance for Nonprofit Governance, to AG

Eliot Spitzer Reporting on the Proceedings of the Alliance for Nonprofit Governance Conference:
Changing Nonprofit Accountability 2 (Dec. 1, 2003) (describing the strong need for clarification of
what
internal
controls
will
mean
for
nonprofit
organizations),
available
at
http://www.angonline.org/spitzcr.doc; Ken Rankin, Nonprofits Balk at Auditing Proposal, ACCT.
TODAY, Aug. 23, 2004, at I (reporting similar concerns).
133. See Mass. Draft Leg. § 1, supra note 1; see also Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations (Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 18, 2004) (addressing internal controls in the
nonprofit context).
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assets that could have a
tion, use or disposition of the public charity's
134
material effect on the financial statements.

Although neither the New York Proposals nor the Revised New York Proposals provide a legislative definition of internal controls, AG Spitzer's
office did recently released a publication on "Internal Controls and Financial Accountability for Not-for-Profit Boards." This pamphlet also concentrates on record-keeping and handling of a nonprofit's funds and other
35
property.1
Assuming that appropriate and workable systems of internal controls
can be identified, it still remains to be seen whether, or to what extent,
mandating them will improve nonprofit behavior. Again, one cannot assume reliability certifications or internal control mandates will prompt
improved behavior from officers already engaged in intentional misconduct. Further, if meaningful and unpleasant consequences will not predictably result from the failure to implement internal controls, it is likewise
doubtful that requiring them will motivate behavioral improvements in
officers who seek to follow only legal rules that are effectively enforced.
For compliant officers, however, reliability certification and internal
control requirements not only issue a mandate to improve behavior, they
provide a blueprint for how to accomplish such improvements. They do so
by demanding the creation of individualized internal controls within organizations. Definitions like those in the Massachusetts draft and the New
York AG's pamphlet instruct nonprofits to create processes to ensure record-keeping and to aid in detecting misappropriations or mistakes. In order to implement reliable internal controls and certify honestly to their
existence, officers will need to establish the specifics of these processes for
their particular organizations. An officer needs to decide how to record
transactions, how long to keep those records, how often to update them,
134. Mass. Draft Leg. § 1,supra note 1. The Massachusetts draft also identifies the appropriate
provenance of an internal controls system. It is tobe:
a process designed by, or under the supervision of, the public charity's principal executive
and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the
public charity's board of directors and/or trustees, management, and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Id.
135. See N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR
NOT-FOR-PROFIT
BOARDS
(2004),
available
at
www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.html. Although the New York AG's focus clearly is on tracking
funds, this guide describes internal controls more broadly than the Massachusetts legislation, as "systems.--not only related to accounting and reporting but also relate[d] to the organization's communication processes, internally and externally." Id. at 2. The six facets of internal controls it provides range
from procedures for "handling funds received and expended" and conducting annual audits to "evaluating staff and programs" and "implementing personnel and conflicts of interest policies." Id.
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and how to monitor them. This decision-making is a valuable governance
exercise that boards and nonofficer employees hopefully would engage in
along with any responsible signing officers. Such an internal evaluation
would school important nonprofit actors in the operations of their nonprofits and should help them to improve their ability to manage and monitor
their organizations.
Regrettably, however, the costs of complying with reliability certification requirements and internal control mandates will cause even compliant
officers to limit the resources they devote to establishing individualized
internal controls. The organizational exploration imagined above requires
substantial expenditures of time and human and financial resources, and
136
maintaining and updating internal controls generates continuing costs.
These costs could well drive nonprofit officers to respond to these new
requirements by adopting generic policies, rather than creating individualized controls sensitive to their specific needs. Nonprofits could adopt such
boilerplate policies in order to devote more resources to other pressing
needs. Or, they might do so as an exercise in calculated risk management in
light of the low level of enforcement. Whatever their motivation, widespread adoption of generic internal controls will decrease the improvements
in nonprofit behavior, and thereby accountability, to be achieved through
reliability certification and internal control requirements.
The financial and other burdens these reforms will impose on nonprofits should not be ignored. Rather, they should be considered in relation to
the likely accountability gains such mandates will create, particularly in
comparison to educational or aspirational approaches. In estimating the
relative gains from mandating reliability certification or internal controls
more generally, one again encounters the problem of potentially overregulating compliant organizations with a requirement their noncompliant
counterparts will flout. Even without these mandates, many nonprofits
already engage in self-evaluative processes and establish needed con-

136. During the transitional period in which consensus on the basic frameworks for nonprofit
internal controls will be developed, reliability certification or internal controls requirements also will
exact some special costs- Uncertainty may cause conscientious officers to expend significant resources
obtaining advice on process creation and implementation. These resources may be difficult to garner
without an accompanying decrease in those dedicated to pursuit of organizational missions. In addition,
the federal proposal's contemplation of personal liability for mistaken reliability certifications may
create additional burdens for the nonprofit sector, as qualified individuals may be further discouraged
from serving as officers in an atmosphere where the route to compliance remains uncertain. These costs
are temporary and may be worth bearing, especially if the requirements are variable or limited to organizations of significant financial magnitude or sophistication. Still, the costs are real, and they should
be recognized in any careful analysis of these reforms.
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trots. 137 More organizations likely would do so if educated about the importance of internal controls and if offered the needed training-at least to
the extent possible without unreasonably detracting from their ability to
accomplish their missions.
Thus, reliability certification and internal control mandates would improve nonprofit accountability over educational or voluntary programs only
to the extent they more effectively motivate nonprofit leaders to establish
and engage in an ongoing process by which abuses and errors may be discovered and corrected. Whether these accountability gains will be deemed
by organizations or should be deemed by legislatures as sufficient to justify
the burdens created by such mandates is an empirical question that will be
difficult to answer with precision. Still, legislators should consider these
issues and cautiously enact reliability certification or internal controls mandates only if they are persuaded the potential for these gains is worth this
risk. Again, the use of financial triggers in at least the state reliability certification proposals suggests some encouraging sensitivity to this question of
38
balance. 1
2.

Auditing Reforms

An analysis of the auditing reforms described in Part II(B) can follow
roughly the same trajectory as that of officer certification requirements, as
they too proceed along dual tracks. Like accuracy certifications, one set of
auditing reforms primarily would enhance disclosure outputs by demanding
that nonprofits generate new audited disclosure documents or, alternatively,
obtain audits of disclosures that they already produce. 139 Like reliability
certifications and other internal control mandates, the other set of proposed
auditing reforms addresses process. These reforms instruct organizations to
137. See Grant Thornton, LLP, National Board Governance Survey for Not-For-Profit Organizations 8 (2004) (reporting that 81% of organizations it surveyed had evaluated their internal control
structure); Warren Strugateh, Nonprofit Agencies' Books Face More Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2004, § 14LI, at 6 (noting charities' concerns about potential regulation akin to Sarbanes-Oxley and that
many already have begun conducting thorough annual audits in response); see also, e.g., News Release,
Office of the President, Drexel University, Drexel Adopts the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Feb. 26, 2003)
(describing Drexel University's decision to adopt a series of "best practices" modeled on the SarbanesOxley Act), availableat http://www.drcxel.edu/papadakis/news-releases/news-releases-feb26-03.asp.
138. Cf Susan Woodward, "Not-For-Profit" Motivation in a "For-Profit" Company Law Regime-National Baseline Data, 21 CO. & SEC. L.J. 102, 105-06 (2003) (arguing that disclosure requirements for Australian nonprofit organizations should vary depending on size and other factors);
SUSAN WOODWARD & SHELLEY MARSHALL, A BETTER FRAMEWORK: REFORMING NOT-FOR-PROrIT

REGULATION 4-6 (2004) (making a similar recommendation for "a sliding scale of disclosure requirements" in a report discussing a survey of Australian nonprofit organizations and recommending various
legal reforms).
139. See, e.g-, Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(1); White Paper, supra note 1, at 9; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 5004(4)(D)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (as amended March 2004).
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vest their boards or board committees with the responsibility to monitor
audit functions. 140 Each type of auditing reform offers some potential to
improve nonprofit behavior; but, again, these improvements will be attainable only if nonprofits are willing and able to bear the costs of their
implementation.
a.

IncreasedAudit Requirements

Reforms that expand audit outputs obviously respond to concerns
about the accuracy of nonprofit disclosures. In this vein, California's proposal would increase audit outputs by requiring large-revenue nonprofit
organizations to begin filing financial reports audited by an independent
CPA. 14 1 The White Paper proposes independent auditing of all Forms 990
by rotating auditors, as well as auditing of financial statements in nonprofits with substantial gross receipts. 142 These reforms call on professionals to
present nonprofits' financial information truthfully and comprehensibly,
and thereby set these gatekeepers to work improving nonprofit behavior.
Although it is hard to argue against independent, expert review of financial statements and tax forms per se, the ability of the proposed outputfocused auditing reforms to improve nonprofit behavior still can be questioned. Like the accuracy certification requirements addressed earlier, proposed requirements for nonprofits to produce audited documents may be
duplicative. Most importantly, various states already require many nonprofit organizations to produce audited financial reports. Massachusetts has
required its larger nonreligious charities to submit audited financial reports
to the AG for decades. 143 A number of other states require significant subsets of their nonprofit communities to produce and file audited financial
reports, generally as part of state regulation of charitable solicitation or
oversight of charitable assets. 144
140. See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 1, § 3(g)(2); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1,
§ 4(g)(2); Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 3; Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2); White Paper, supra
note 1, at 12.

141. See Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(l).
142. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 9. As noted earlier, supra note 81, the Nonprofit Panel has
also recommended a significant increase in required auditing of nonprofit financial statements.
143. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 12 § 8F (West 2004) (originally enacted in 1979 and trigger-

ing the audited financial statement requirement at receipts of $100,000, $250,000, and most recently
$500,000).
144. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. The fact that audited financial statements are
already often required, particularly of larger nonprofits, should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence that auditing can forestall lapses in nonprofit accountability. One cross-industry study indicated
that internal audits detected a smaller percentage of occupational frauds in not-for-profit organizations
than did most other detection methods. See ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE
at
available
ABUSE
25
(2004),
FRAUD
AND
OCCUPATIONAL
NATION
ON
http://www.cfenet.com/pdfs/2004RttN.pdf. The study also showed that internal audits detected a
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To the extent that the proposed reforms will impose new audit requirements, the degree of compliance with them still may vary across organizations. Certainly, if the scandal at Enron has taught us anything, it is
that auditing of financial disclosures cannot bring to light those abuses with
which the auditor is complicit or willfully ignorant. Nonetheless, compliant
nonprofits subject to new audit requirements can be expected to obtain
audits and file audited documents in response to them. Furthermore, audit
requirements will be more difficult to fudge than officer certifications,
unless audited documents are easily faked or even total failure to file them
will go unnoticed and unpunished. Thus, one should expect new audit requirements to spur some increase in the incidence of nonprofit auditing.
Review by objective outside auditors should improve the accuracy and
clarity of the information nonprofits produce and report. It also should unearth at least some inaccuracies and abuses that otherwise would go unnoticed. And, auditors, barring complicity in abuse or disregard of their
professional obligations, should demand their correction. Thus, increasing
the incidence of auditing could produce at least some improvements in
nonprofit behavior.
To determine the value of increased audit requirements as nonprofit
reform legislation, however, the cost of these requirements also is an important factor. Hiring auditors obviously demands funds; 145 rotating auditors on a periodic basis, as the White Paper proposes, would add to this cost
of audit procurement. For increased audit requirements to be effective reforms, the gains in nonprofit behavior and accountability they promise
must justify the additional costs they will impose on nonprofit organizations, for some of whom these new costs could be fatal. All of the state and
most of the federal reform proposals acknowledge the reality of this trade-

off, again by keying their increased auditing requirements to some indica46
tors of financial magnitude.1

smaller percentage of frauds in not-for-profits than in other types of organizations, even when one
controlled for not-for-profits' lower incidence of auditing. Id. According to this research, a much
greater percentage of occupational frauds were detected through tips, both in not-for-profit and other
types of organizations. Id.
145. The Nonprofit Panel considered these costs in crafling its recommendations on auditing. See
NONPROFIT PANEL INTERtM REPORT, supra note 41, at 23-24 (explaining that the Panel decided to
trigger an audit requirement at S2 million in annual revenues because of data suggesting audits would
cost such organizations less than 1% of their total budgets). For another commentator's estimates of
audit costs, see Szymanski, supra note 11, at 1318146. Only the federal proposal demanding auditing of the Form 990 appears not to differentiate by
size. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 9.
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b.

Auditing Oversight Reforms

Rather than relying on external gatekeepers, the auditing oversight reforms set out to improve nonprofit behavior by activating self-regulation.
These proposals demand that nonprofits of a certain size improve their
ability to self-monitor and provide them with a process for doing so. In the
New York, Massachusetts, California, and federal reforms, a large nonprofit is instructed to charge an internal body with scrutinizing the work of
147
auditors and to empower that body to compensate, hire, and fire auditors.
The state reforms assign this responsibility to an audit committee whose
members must be financially independent, 14 8 while the White Paper desig49
nates the entire board as the appropriate audit oversight mechanism.1
Regardless of the oversight group selected, these proposals focus the attention of an identifiable set of nonprofit fiduciaries on the importance of accurate and effective financial reporting and grant them the authority to
demand it from the auditors they engage.
Auditing oversight reforms thus demand improvements of the disclosure process, and not merely an escalation of disclosure outputs. These
reforms leverage the capacities already within nonprofit organizations by
demanding that they self-monitor and self-enforce. 150 Without strengthen147 See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(g); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1,
§ 4(g); Mass. Draft Leg., supra note 1, § 3; Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2); White Paper, supra note I,
at 12.
148. See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(g); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1,
§ 4(g); Mass. Draft Leg., supranote 1, § 3, Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2).
149. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 11-12. As discussed supra note 83, the Nonprofit Panel
Interim Report parts ways with all of these reform efforts on this issue. The Nonprofit Panel recognized
the importance of audit oversight, but urged organizations to decide for themselves how best to engage
in this function, and opposed imposition of a government-mandated mechanism. See NONPROFIT PANEL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 31.
150. The White Paper also offers other proposals aimed more broadly at improving governance
within tax-exempt organizations. Unfortunately, many of these proposals take the form of governance
mandates and stark prophylactic rules. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 1, at 4, 13 (imposing onerous
penalties on even beneficial transactions between tax-exempt public charities and their directors and
managers and imposing a strict fifteen-member limit on tax-exempt boards of directors). Parts of the
New York and Massachusetts efforts also aim at more general governance concerns, however, they tend
to set up default measures or processes to enable good governance that are more flexible than those the
White Paper suggests. Compare id., with N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 3(f) (requiring
an executive committee in boards with more than twenty-five members, unless the bylaws prohibit such
a committee); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § 4(f) (similar); N.Y. AG Program Bill 65-05, supra note
17 (adding a fairness requirement to protect self-dealing transactions and setting procedures to protect a
board's compensation decisions); N.Y. Senate Bill, supra note 1, § 5 (similar), and Mass. Draft Leg.,
supra note 1, § 4 (similarly revising state law on nonprofit self-dealing and compensation).
In one striking example of the White Paper's mandate approach, it provides an extensive list
of "best practices" for boards of exempt organizations, all of which each organization would be required to "confirm" on its Form 990. White Paper, supra note 1, at 12-13. Many of these practices are
indeed those to which exempt organizations should aspire, and an educational effort to apprise organizations of these and other methods for achieving greater accountability would be quite beneficial. The
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ing the mechanisms for enforcement, no new legal requirement can hope to
secure improvements in behavior from willfully disloyal or criminal fiduciaries, or those who respond only to the likelihood of public or private sanctions. It also remains unclear whether and to what extent nonprofit actors
charged with auditing oversight will have the expertise to improve auditing
performance and financial accountability.' 5 1 However, the auditing oversight reforms at least direct some individuals within the nonprofit to work
on this important task. For those compliant officers and organizations that
follow this direction, the auditing oversight reforms educate them in one
technique available to improve their behavior and provide a framework for
their efforts to achieve greater accountability. In addition to thereby improving specific audit oversight behavior, active members of auditing oversight groups will develop more general skills of supervision. These
fiduciaries can then employ these skills to improve their conduct in other
areas of nonprofit governance entrusted to them.
Of course, the benefits that auditing oversight reforms promise will
not come free of charge. New responsibilities for audit committee or board
members may make it more difficult to recruit volunteers to these crucial
roles. Individuals asked (or required) to conduct auditing oversight also
may need additional training and legal or accounting support. These costs
may encourage organizations that would otherwise prefer full compliance
Form 990 confirmation, however, appears instead to require all exempt organizations to attest to their
adoption of these particular practices, an unwise attempt to mandate governance techniques across the
sector. Rather than relying on "one-size-fits-all" mandates, good nonprofit governance requires each
individual organization to evaluate itself and to determine those structures and practices that will ensure
accountability within its unique circumstances.
One commentator has advocated an intriguing alternative approach to motivating best practices through Form 990 disclosures, proposing that the form be revised to ask nonprofits a series of yesor-no board governance questions. See Deborah S. Hechinger, A Simple Way to Help Nonprofit Boards,
CHRON PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 5, 2004, at 45. She explained:
While the priinary purpose of the form would be to allow government and the public to keep a
closer eye on board activities, developing questions about board-govemance practices could
be a powerful way to educate executives and board members of charitable organizations about
the importance of governance in general, and about basic practices that put boards in a position to act as independent overseers.
Id. The Nonprofit Panel recommended at least partial adoption of this suggestion, on a similar rationale.
See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 30 (proposing that organizations be required
to disclose on Forms 990 whether they have a conflict of interest policy).
151. While none of the current nonprofit reform proposals demand that the audit committee include
a financial expert, an early draft of the California proposal did contain such a requirement, as does the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407(a) and Attorney General, State of
California, Proposed Amendments to Government Code Section 12580 et seq. 3 (Jan. 8, 2004) (unpublished memorandum on file with author) (requiring a financial expert to serve on the audit committee),
with Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(2) (imposing an audit committee requirement without demanding
that a financial expert be a member). The Nonprofit Panel recommends the inclusion of financially
literate individuals on boards of directors as a good practice, but would not go so far as to mandate it.
See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 31.
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with these reforms to skimp on their implementation. And, even if the .reforms are fully implemented, these costs will reduce the nonprofit resources available to serve their missions and beneficiaries. Thus, again, the
benefits of increased audit oversight should be weighed carefully against
the costs it will impose, and these serious burdens should not lightly be
imposed on strapped nonprofit organizations. The triggers currently contained in the state proposals attempt to limit the application of these reforms to organizations of sufficient financial magnitude or sophistication to
bear them. These and other limitations of expensive auditing reforms
should be set carefully, as errors could reduce the availability of vital nonprofit services.
B.

FacilitatingEnforcement

This subpart considers the potential for disclosure reforms to enhance
nonprofit accountability by facilitating enforcement. Thus far, this Article
has used the concept of disclosure to refer to both disclosure to regulators
and disclosure to the public. Many of the recent disclosure-based reforms
identified here provide for both of these audiences. 152 In analyzing the
ability of disclosure-based reforms to improve behavior,-in effect, by
deterring misbehavior for fear of detection and its consequences-the two
types of disclosure can be effectively analyzed together. When considering
the ability of these reforms to facilitate enforcement, however, it is important to separate at least two distinct methods for enforcing the obligations
of nonprofit actors and organizations. Enforcement may be pursued by
government actors, including state AGs, other state regulators, and the
federal IRS. Nongovernmental actors also may engage in enforcement.
Occasionally, this might occur through private litigation of nonprofit fiduciary breaches or other wrongs. Nongovernmental enforcement of nonprofit
activities more likely occurs, however, through actions short of litigation
that nonetheless have the power to discipline the behavior of nonprofits and
their fiduciaries. In order for disclosure-based reforms to enhance accountability by facilitating enforcement, they must boost the enforcement capacity of one or both of these groups.

152. Of course, at least one important set of disclosure-based reforms addressed here would not
necessarily require enhancements of data provided to regulators or the public. The certification requirements in the original New York Proposals would have applied only to nonprofits' internal reports.
It is considerably more difficult to argue that changes to internal reports will facilitate enforcement by

any external monitors.
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Facilitating Enforcement Through Disclosure to Regulators

At present, governmental enforcers of nonprofit obligations are seriously encumbered by their lack of resources. The scarcity of resources for
nonprofit enforcement by states is legendary. In the legal literature, the
identification of this lack of staffing and funding for state investigation and
153
enforcement of wrongdoing in nonprofits goes back forty years or more.
Over the decades since these early critiques of states' nonprofit enforcement capacity, some advances have been made, 154 particularly in the states
with the greatest amount of assets under nonprofit control. 155 Despite this
incremental improvement, however, recent work confirms that the nonprofit enforcement budgets of state AGs remain limited or, in some cases,
nonexistent. 156 While IRS enforcement does ameliorate to some degree this
lack of enforcement at the state level, 157 even the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has recognized the inadequacy of his agency's resources devoted
158
to the tax-exempt area.
153. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency ofthe Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 452-54 (1960); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 114, at 446.
154. Marion Fremont-Smith and others have compiled detailed information tracking the staff size
of state AG charities bureaus over time. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 65, at 351-61; FREMONTSMITH, supra note 114, at 446; HARRIET BOGRAD, THE ROLE OF STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL IN
RELATION TO TROUBLED NONPROFITS 8-11 (Program on Nonprofit Orgs., Yale University, Working
Paper No. 206, Aug. 1994); see also Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1184-85 &
nn.465-72 (2001) (collecting and analyzing information from Bograd and a 1998 Chronicle of Philanthropy study by Thomas J. Billitteri).
155. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 65, at 353-54 (describing the increase in AG staff in
California, from 4 in 1965 to 10 attorneys and 10 auditors in 2003, and in New York, from 10 in 1974
to 13 in 1996 at a total of 18 attorneys and 6 accountants since the late 1990s); Josephson, supra note
101, at 2 (describing hiring 14 of New York Charities Bureau's 20 attorneys during his tenure, although
not discussing whether these were additional attorneys or replacements); Brody, supra note 104, at 951
(noting that "a simple headcount is misleading" in light of Bograd's 1996 findings that the thirteen
states with charities divisions within their AG offices were home to 55% of the country's charities and
62% of its charitable revenues). But see Crimm, supra note 154, at 1184 (asserting that the number of
staff attorneys available for nonprofit enforcement had declined in some of the most historically active
states).
156. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 65, at 352 (noting that although state AGs have managed to
achieve some nonprofit regulatory and enforcement successes, "[a]ll of them operate with severely
limited budgets, which has meant a shortage of legal and accounting support"); see also Evelyn Brody,
Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 479 (Lester M. Salamon
ed., 2002) ("Funding for charity enforcement has never been high, at either the state or federal
level ... ").
157. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 65, at 377 (describing the federal government as "the primary source of regulation" of nonprofits since the 1950s); NORMAN 1. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF
FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 151 (2001) (reporting and critiquing
the assertion that the IRS can or has effectively played this role).
158. See Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Written Statement of Appearance
Before the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate at the Hearing on Charitable Giving
June
22,
2004,
available
at
http://finane.senProblems
and
Best
Practices,
ate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/O62204metest.pdf. Everson noted:
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Reforms that increase or improve disclosure to regulators will be hard
pressed to facilitate enforcement in the context of such limited resources
for governmental enforcement. Disclosure documents can be used for governmental enforcement only if regulators read them, investigate the inconsistencies or problems they reveal, and act to correct or stop errors or
abuses. State regulators are ill-equipped to initiate enforcement efforts
based on the more limited disclosures they already receive. Without increased funding for staffing and other resources, they cannot be expected to
make serious accountability gains through investigation, prosecution, or
settlement of problems revealed by improved disclosures. Disappointingly,
none of the nonprofit reform proposals recently before state legislatures
envisions this necessary allocation of resources to state regulators.
In contrast, the federal proposal does include significant reforms addressing this fundamental resource problem. Like state regulators, the IRS
presently has more information regarding compliant tax-exempt organizations than it is able to review systematically, as well as broad investigatory
and enforcement powers over tax-exempt entities without adequate staff to
exploit them. To remedy this, the White Paper would direct new funding to
the IRS unit on exempt organizations. 159 In addition, the proposal would
Historically, IRS functions regulating tax-exempt entities have not been well funded due to
the lack of revenue they generated .... With staffing in this area flat at best and with the
number of charities increasing annually, our audit coverage has fallen to historically low levels, compromising our ability to maintain an effective enforcement presence in the exempt
organizations community.
Id.
The need for investment in IRS enforcement may be even more acute in the exempt organizations area than in other areas of tax enforcement. In general, the return on investment from auditing and
other IRS enforcement activities is quite significant, in terms of the quantum of tax liability recommended, assessed and collected directly traceable to IRS enforcement or by fostering norms of greater
tax compliance- See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFqiCE, GAO/GGD-98-128, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE
Ron PORTMAN, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 14-15 & tbl. 3 (June
23, 1998) (reporting an 11:1 average ratio of tax payments collected from audits to the direct staff costs
of such audits, although conceding there may be some measurement problems with this data); Leandra
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J 1453,
1510-13 (2003) (noting the GAO study results and arguing that investment in tax enforcement can
generate returns beyond the taxes collected in audits, by fostering norms of tax compliance). Thus, an
initial investment in tax enforcement may well be quickly recouped. In the exempt organizations area,
increased enforcement may result in some additional payment of taxes, at least initially, but ultimately
may not provide a significant financial return on investment to the IRS. For example, additional enforcement may unearth abuses that merit imposition of excise taxes or stripping of exemption from
taxable entities masquerading as exempts. In the long run, however, if increased enforcement leads to a
higher level of compliance with exemption criteria, this enforcement may not provide significant fimancial returns to the IRS. I thank Richard Schmalbeck for this insight.
159. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 15-16 (proposing authorization for $5 million to facilitate
public access to Forms 990, as well as additional funds to establish a whistleblower hotline, to ease
information sharing with other state and federal regulators with overlapping oversight responsibilities in
the nonprofit sector, and to fund the proposed process of periodic review of the continuing eligibility of
exempt organizations). The Nonprofit Panel has indicated its strong support for increasing the resources
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allocate funds to improve enforcement by states and self-regulation within
the nonprofit community. 160 The federal proposals also come at a time
when the President and the IRS are seeking to increase funding for the
161
Service's enforcement in the tax-exempt area.
One might criticize as inadequate the $200 million envisioned by the
White Paper to improve nonprofit enforcement, but the more basic problem
with this funding proposal is that it may never come to fruition. The plans
for increasing enforcement resources and the sweeping scope of the proposed uses of them are tempting, but it remains highly uncertain that the
IRS, states, and others will ultimately receive these funds, and from what
sources they will be obtained. The White Paper proposes to fund its initia162
tives by two alternative routes: earmarked tax revenues or filing fees.
Under its first funding scenario, the White Paper would reinstate an
authorization for up to $200 million of revenue collected from the 2% investment income tax on private foundations to be appropriated for IRS
enforcement in the exempt organizations area. 163 This tax was imposed in
1969, along with an authorization for the funds to be earmarked for exempt
organizations enforcement. 164 However, authorization alone cannot channel
revenues from the general treasury to specific programs; this requires appropriation.165 In 1998, when almost thirty years had passed without appropriation of these authorized funds for exempt organizations
enforcement, Congress repealed even the authorization provision. 166 The
Senate Finance Committee proposes only to reinstate the authorization; it
does not have the power to provide for appropriation. Considering its provision of alternative means to fund many of its proposals through filing

available to the IRS for nonprofit enforcement. See NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4 1,
at 47.
160. White Paper, supra note 1, at 15 (offering grants and matching funds to states for use in
nonprofit enforcement).
161. See Everson, supra note 158, at 2 (noting the President's request for a 4.8% increase in the
IRS budget in 2005 and that he expects to increase spending on examination of government and taxexempt entities by 17% in that year).
162. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 15. The vagaries of the congressional and IRS budget processes are beyond the scope of this Article; therefore, it will discuss in detail only the potential funding
solutions currently proposed in the White Paper. It should be kept in mind, however, that the IRS'
receipt of the President's proposed budget increase and the Service's ultimate use of these funds certainly are not a foregone conclusion.
163. Id.
164. See Catherine E. Livingston, Analysis of the Repeal of the Section 4940 Excise Tax, at

http://www.abagmd.org/info-url3989/info-urlshow.htm?doc
165.

See
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HENIFF,
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JR.,

(2003),
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SERV.,

id=204851 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/R-

S20371 .pdf.
166. See Livingston, supra note 164.
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fees, it seems the Committee anticipates a repetition of this unsatisfying
appropriation history.
Failing appropriation of tax revenues to fund its reform proposals, the
White Paper recommends a series of fees to be imposed on tax-exempt
filers. 167 Serious doubts can be raised too as to whether this funding solution will come to pass or would be advisable. At times, the filing fees contemplated by the
reform proposal are helpfully described as based on a
"sliding scale."' 168 Still, legislators will be beseeched to consider carefully
the financial burden any additional fees may place on resource-strapped
nonprofits. These concerns are not specious. Even small fees, when added
to the substantial costs of preparing the documents to be filed, may overwhelm some nonprofits' administrative budgets, compelling them to reallocate funds from worthy programs or even forcing them to close their doors.
In the face of these concerns, legislators might understandably opt to enact
their proposed reforms without the filing fee funding solution to which they
are currently linked.
Unfortunately, without an improvement of funding and thereby of
manpower, the federal proposal's certification and auditing reforms will do
little to improve the capacity of the IRS to enforce nonprofit accountability.
In this reasonably likely scenario, the resource obstacle to successful disclosure-based regulation will persist on the federal level as well.
2. Facilitating Enforcement Through Public Disclosure
In addition to requiring greater disclosure to regulators, many of the
current disclosure-based proposals for nonprofit reform demand that disclosures be made available to the public. 169 Perhaps individuals or groups
with access to this new and improved public information could use it to
pressure nonprofits to be more accountable. Unfortunately, nongovernmental actors have insufficient resources, incentives, and authority to adequately enforce nonprofit accountability. These persistent deficits are in
large part due to structural characteristics inherent to nonprofit organizations and the nonprofit sector, and will limit the ability of disclosure-based
reforms to facilitate public enforcement.
167. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 1, at 15 (providing for fees to be assessed on Form 990
filers and for these fees to be used to fund various initiatives, in lieu of an appropriation),
168. See, e.g., id. at I (describing a sliding scale filing fee for its proposed periodic reporting
system for tax-exempt organizations).

169. See, e.g., Cal. Act, supra note 1, § 7(e)(1) (requiring charities to make available to the public
audited financial statements required by the Act); White Paper, supra note 1,at 10 (requiring public

disclosure of financial statements by exempt organizations); see also Joint Committee Report, supra
note 41, at308-12 (proposing a requirement that exempt organizations should publicly disclose their
Forms 990-T, which forms report exempt organizations' unrelated business income).
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These differences in context expose the inadequacy of analogies to the
for-profit sector to justify disclosure-based nonprofit reform. In the forprofit context, particularly when dealing with the publicly-traded companies regulated by Sarbanes-Oxley, lawmakers need not rely solely on government regulators to unearth and contest errors and abuses revealed in
disclosure documents. Several groups of private actors have incentives to
dissect these disclosures and authority to challenge any questionable activity they bring to light. Stockholders with assets bound up in shares of a
company have a personal financial motivation to review the company's
disclosures, and are empowered to take action when warranted through the
derivative suit mechanism. Collective action problems undoubtedly hinder
170
monitoring and enforcement by widely dispersed equity shareholders.
But, these problems are mitigated by the existence of research analysts and
plaintiffs' attorneys with the expertise and incentives to obtain and distribute information about companies' strengths and weaknesses, and to chal171
lenge mistakes and misbehavior in court.
The nonprofit sector lacks comparable private groups motivated and
authorized to act on disclosed information. 172 Charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations with self-perpetuating boards lack any analogue to forprofit shareholders. Moreover, even in those nonprofit corporations that opt
to empower members to elect directors and vote on major corporate decisions, these members lack the personal financial incentives that equity
shareholders have to track and challenge the behavior of nonprofit managers and fiduciaries. 173 Members also may lack enforcement mechanisms, as
standing to challenge nonprofit actions often is severely limited. 174 There
are currently no actors with access and powers analogous to those of research analysts and plaintiffs' lawyers in the nonprofit context; the collective action problem for members remains intractable.

170. This insight can be traced back as far as Berle and Means. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, TIE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (making the
seminal point that, in corporations with many widely dispersed individual shareholders, these shareholders cannot practically control management).
171. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American
Corporations,46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 340-42 (1998) (describing how class action plaintiffs' attorneys
compensated with contingency fees can overcome shareholders' collective action problems); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) (noting the function of research analysts in overcoming shareholder collective
action problems).
172. See Dana Brakman Reiscr, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 859--64 (2003).
173. See id. at 859-62.
174. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the CharitableSector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37,
54-59 (1993) (describing the differential availability of member standing in various states).
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Rather than looking to members, one might consider donors as the appropriate nongovernmental group to engage in nonprofit enforcement. Limited standing rules generally will prevent donors from engaging in
enforcement of nonprofit obligations in court.175 But, lawsuits are clearly
not the only powerful sanction for misconduct within nonprofit organizations. For those nonprofits that rely on individual donations, grant funding,
or both, donors' ability to withhold future contributions could influence
nonprofit fiduciaries regardless of the possibility of a future lawsuit. If so,
one must ask whether recent disclosure reform ideas are likely to enhance
nonprofit accountability by facilitating enforcement by donors. If nonprofits disclose sufficient and comprehensible information to the public, will
donors use it comparatively, and donate more time and money to more
accountable nonprofits? Unfortunately, this important question has not yet
been satisfactorily answered.
Among individual donors, evidence has not yet suggested that donor
choice will be a robust enforcement tool. 176 As a group, individual donors
making relatively small contributions have serious collective action problems. Many such donors will quite reasonably not be willing to expend the
time and energy required to investigate potential recipients of their charity

in advance. The threat of withholding future contributions also may not be
powerful enough for individual small donors successfully to demand that a
nonprofit improve its accountability. Some AGs and umbrella organiza-

tions of nonprofits have begun to pool information regarding nonprofit
performance and financial accountability, in order to enable enforcement
through individual donor choice. 177 The federal proposal appears to support
175. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?, 23 1 CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998) (noting that traditionally only the attorney general and
perhaps cofiduciaries will have standing and access to standing for all others is extremely limited). But
see Unif. Trust Code § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. 184 (Supp. 2004) (expanding standing to settlors of charitable
trust in a recent revision); Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (granting standing to enforce the terms of a gift to the widow of the donor, in what for now
remains an exceptional case).
176. See William F. Meehan III et al., Investing in Society, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Spring 2004, at 35, 36 (describing studies and comments indicating that donors do not investigate the
financial and governance practices of an organization before donating to it); Katie Cunningham & Marc
Ricks, Why Measure?: Nonprofits Use Metrics to Show that They Are Efficient. But What if Donors
Don't Care?, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2004, at 44 (reporting a study of donor
interest in performance measures, and finding it negligible); see also David Bomstein, Let's Make Sure
Worthy Groups Get Aid, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 22, 2004, at 37 (opining that "most donors...
pay little attention to the comparative performance of the organizations they support," based on limited
information currently available, and advocating establishment of nonprofit research analysts to provide
more).
177. See, e.g., OFFICE OF N.Y- ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, PENNIES FOR CHARITY: WHERE
YOUR MONEY GOES, TELEMARKETING BY PROFESSIONAL FUNDRAISERS (Dec. 2003) (reporting one
AG's findings on comparative fundraising costs), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charitiespennies03/penintro.html; Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Standards for Excellence: An
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these efforts through its advocacy of accreditation. 178 For now though, even

if more and better public disclosures are made available to individual donors through officer certification, increased audit requirements, or enhanced tax reporting, individual donors' incentive and coordination
problems will continue to impede their ability to enforce nonprofit
79
obligations. 1
The disclosure-based reforms addressed here also will have only a
narrow impact on larger, more sophisticated donors. Donors who make
large contributions and are predictable repeat players, particularly grantmakers, are less subject to the problems of collective action that frustrate
enforcement by small donors. But, enhancing public disclosures as envisioned by recent proposals for disclosure-based reform will do little to expand the already significant informational access grantmakers enjoy.
Consider a foundation whose major purpose is to make relatively large
grants. This foundation can and should devote resources to gathering information that will allow it to choose the best recipients from among various applicants. Further, the substantial funds the foundation's grants can
offer, as well as the potential to obtain a stream of such funding from this
foundation or others, provide a significant incentive for nonprofit grant
applicants to provide the foundation with information it requests and to
conform their activities to the foundation's preferences. 180 Simply put, if a
nonprofit wants a grant from the foundation, it will provide it with a significant amount of information, whether or not that information must be
Ethics and Accountability Code for the Nonprofit Sector (explaining the nonprofit accountability standards
and
practices
to
which
its
members
must
commit),
available
at
http://www.marylandnonprofits.org/html/standards/04_02.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); BBB Wise
Giving Alliance, About the BBB Wise Giving Alliance (describing the Wise Giving Alliance charity
rating program, sponsored by the Better Business Bureau), at www.give.org/about/index.asp (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005). See generally Silverman, supra note 27, at DI (reporting on these and other
ongoing nonprofit accreditation efforts).
178. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 14-15.
179. Even if one assumes a sufficient number of individual donors would seek out information
about potential donee nonprofits, and that this donor-choice activity would powerfully discipline nonprofit actors, donor enforcement remains problematic. Measuring nonprofit effectiveness is notoriously
difficult, and it is particularly difficult to measure, report, and compare nonfinancial performance. See,
e.g., Rosabeth Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
Moreover, donors may misinterpret the information they receive. Cf Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REv. 433, 502 (1996) (warning that expanded standing will
not improve charity oversight unless and until the nonprofit sector educates the public about its real
fiscal needs and cost constraints, of which the public seems unaware). If donors misinterpret the information they review, and their desires are anticipated and catered to by nonprofit organizations, it may
skew nonprofit activity in undesirable ways.
180. Of course, this desire to offer programs that foundations or other grantmakers will fund may
also skew nonprofit activities away from some socially desirable activities.
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made available to the general public. Thus, although grantmakers can be
effective donor enforcers, it is difficult to believe that officer certifications,
audit reforms, and other requirements for increased disclosure will make
them substantially more effective in this role.
Finally, it is worth noting that even if disclosure-based reforms might
facilitate enforcement by donors, these efforts are certain to be incomplete.
Many nonprofits do not support their programs primarily through fundraising or grant-seeking activities; they rely instead on fees paid for services
and other income sources. It is very difficult to imagine that consumers will
obtain and use the enhanced public disclosures demanded by the proposals
addressed here to elect where to receive medical care, obtain an education,
or attend a performance.
There is a basic problem of fit when adapting disclosure-based reforms stemming from Sarbanes-Oxley to the nonprofit context. Disclosurebased reforms have been seen as a useful technique to improve financial
accountability in for-profit entities, especially large, publicly-traded companies with the capacity to bear these costs. These reforms work in part by
improving the quality of information disclosed to regulators, shareholders,
plaintiffs' attorneys, and the public. The same types of reforms, however,
are unlikely to translate into similar gains in the nonprofit sector, due to
differences in the capacity of nonprofit regulators and private groups to use
information disclosed to them to enforce accountability. Unless disclosure
reforms target and overcome these impediments, they will be unable to
move nonprofits toward greater accountability by facilitating enforcement.
Disclosure-based reforms are often advocated with a nod to Justice
Brandeis' pithy observation that "sunlight is ... the best of disinfectants." 18 1 However, the preceding analysis reveals the serious limitations of
disclosure to improve nonprofit behavior or facilitate nonprofit enforcement. Those disclosure reforms that merely replicate existing requirements
show little promise to improve the behavior of nonprofit organizations and
actors. Even when they impose new disclosure requirements, these reforms
can improve behavior only to the extent that nonprofit fiduciaries will be
willing and able to expend organizational resources on compliance with
them. The officer certification and additional audit requirements also will
do little to facilitate enforcement. Without addressing serious staff and
funding shortages faced by regulators, increasing the incidence or depth of
181. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper & Row
1967) (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient police-

man.,,).
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disclosure will not significantly facilitate enforcement. Nor can they empower other stakeholders lacking sufficient incentives and authority to
enforce effectively. Finally, this lack of enforcement will further limit the
ability of disclosure reforms to deter carelessness or misconduct by nonprofit actors.
IV.

IMPROVING DISCLOSURE-BASED NONPROFIT REFORM

For the reasons articulated in Part III, disclosure-based reforms like
mandatory officer certification and increased auditing requirements are
unlikely alone to transform the accountability of the nonprofit sector. At
the same time, legislators' clear desire to improve nonprofit accountability
should not be squandered. Given the already extensive body of legal and
regulatory requirements imposed on nonprofits, and the distressing shortage of enforcement capacity of regulators and others to investigate and
prosecute violations of these requirements, this legislative momentum ideally would be directed toward invigorating enforcement. First and foremost, this would entail significantly improving the resources available for
enforcement of nonprofit responsibilities by state AGs and the IRS. As a
complement to government enforcement, legislators might consider reforms to counter impediments to enforcement by members, donors, and
beneficiaries. They also should invest in training nonprofit fiduciaries to
engage in self-regulation on the organizational level.
If legislators and regulators cannot or will not pursue an alternative
enforcement-based agenda, they might at least be convinced to adopt only
those disclosure-based reforms suited to facilitating nonprofit enforcement
and improving the behavior of nonprofit organizations and actors. Reformers committed to a disclosure approach should look for tactics that will
improve regulators' ability to analyze the information they already receive.
They also should concentrate on disclosure requirements that will spur the
creation and improvement of internal processes in those nonprofits to
which they apply.] 8 2 However, this regulated group should be deliberately
limited, in recognition of the thin line between demanding the creation of
structures to foster accountability and compelling nonprofits to pursue
regulatory compliance at the expense of their missions. This Part addresses
these alternatives and adjustments to the disclosure-based agendas represented by recent legislative proposals for nonprofit reform.

182. As discussed below, the evolution of the proposals for nonprofit reform in New York represent a substantial and positive advance in this direction. See infra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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A.

Targetingthe Impediments to Enforcement

As the regulatory systems for enforcing obligations within the nonprofit sector are currently funded and staffed, it is simply not possible to
use disclosure as the primary means for enforcement. Neither state AGs nor
the IRS have the capacity to analyze and manage the information presently
disclosed to them, let alone more frequent or more voluminous submissions. Therefore, rather than emphasizing disclosure enhancements, legislatures seeking nonprofit accountability gains should authorize and
appropriate significantly increased funds earmarked for regulators to enforce current nonprofit law. Hopefully, the White Paper's funding proposals represent more than mere wishful thinking. If these and additional
funding provisions could be obtained in Congress and imitated in further
revisions of state reforms, 183 significant improvements in enforcement and
accountability would be within reach.
If political realities suggest that enlarging the governmental enforcement pie is unlikely,18 4 legislatures still can use their reform efforts to improve the efficiency of the resources already deployed in this area. One
promising route is to harness technology, as in the White Paper's endorsement of electronic filing. Electronic filing would allow nonprofits to submit
more useful and accurate filings and provide regulators a better means to
use disclosed information to target their limited enforcement resources. The
White Paper's proposal for increased information sharing between federal
and state regulators likewise offers streamlining improvements, by saving
time for existing staff to engage in more individualized investigations.
Even if vastly increased funding of nonprofit enforcement is unlikely, disclosure-based reforms that aim to more efficiently deploy limited government enforcement resources will be some consolation.
When customizing disclosure reforms to the nonprofit sector, legislators should limit their reliance on public disclosure to improve accountability by facilitating enforcement. Again, the problem is the lack of
constituencies sufficiently motivated and educated to scrutinize nonprofit
disclosures and empowered to act on discrepancies or abuses they uncover.
183. Of course, even if funding for external enforcement could be substantially increased, it will
never be possible for state attorneys general and internal revenue agents to police the activities of every
nonprofit intimately, nor would it be desirable to do so. The attorney general is not intended, after all, to
be "a 'super' member of the board." Brody, supra note 104, at 976.
184. One Senate Finance Committee staffer's comment that calls to focus on enforcement of existing rules rather than the creation of new ones should be left on "the cutting room floor" does not augur
well for a renewed focus on enforcement. See Stokeld, supra note 37. Cf Cheng, supra note 115, at 7176 (identifying a range of forces that motivate legislators to enact new criminal prohibitions, rather than
focusing on improving enforcement).
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Grantmakers already have the capacity to demand and analyze information
and pursue change by those nonprofit actors and organizations seeking
their support. But, even significantly enhanced disclosure will not facilitate
enforcement by relatively inattentive and weak individual donors or by
consumers of the goods and services nonprofits provide. Enhancing public
disclosures may add to the "sunlight" factor in deterring misbehavior. It
may also be socially valuable in increasing the information available to the
public about nonprofit organizations for reasons other than facilitating enforcement.' 8 5 Yet, legislators should not overestimate the ability of disclosure-based reform to secure nonprofit accountability by aiding
nongovernmental enforcement.
B.

StimulatingImproved Nonprofit Behavior

Realistically, enforcement alone cannot fully safeguard nonprofit accountability. Funding for government enforcement is unlikely to increase
dramatically, and donors and consumers are inconsistent enforcers at best.
Instead, serious gains in accountability require those within nonprofits to
initiate changes in their personal or organizational conduct. These actors
have proximity and access to the information that regulators and donors
lack or are unable to manage and compare effectively. Through their roles
in the governance and operations of their organizations, directors, officers,
and staff also have the power to demand and implement ongoing and responsive change. The desire of these nonprofit actors to see their organizations thrive should be leveraged to the cause of improving accountability
within individual nonprofits.
In an environment of limited external enforcement and internal resources, simple commands that nonprofits improve their behavior are
unlikely to secure real change. Nonprofit fiduciaries and employees need to
be trained to fulfill their monitoring and enforcement roles more effectively. Therefore, again, providing funds for education and capacitybuilding would be highly desirable. In this vein, the White Paper's proposal
of $25 million aimed to "ensure an education presence"'1 86 in the nonprofit

185. Commentators had hoped the IRS' c-filing initiative would pave the way for the establishment
of a publicly-available database of nonprofit information, to be used by scholars and policymakers.
Unfortunately,. the IRS recently announced plans for capturing and maintaining information electronically provided by exempt filers that would make such a database infeasible. See Harvy Lipman, Tax
Agency Declines to CreateSeparate Charity Database,CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 17, 2005, at 27.
186. White Paper, supra note I, at 15. The Nonprofit Panel also has advocated an important role for
education and training. See, e.g., NONPROFIT PANEL INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 31 -33 (reeomnending technical assistance and "a sector-wide effort to educate charitable organizations" about

auditing and oversight roles of board members and education about whistleblower protections).
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sector is heartening. The drafters' commitment to education, however, appears closely linked to their interest in accreditation and its potential use in
determining eligibility for tax benefits or federal grants. 187 It is unclear
whether the educational initiative, and the funding for it, would survive if
unhinged from the Committee's accreditation imperative. Some states do
provide materials and training for nonprofit fiduciaries and employees, but
none of the recent state legislative proposals includes a commitment to
maintain or increase funding for educational efforts. If, as it appears, legislators favor enacting new disclosure directives over directly investing in the
training of nonprofit fiduciaries and employees, they would be welladvised to emphasize reforms that can educate and empower these potential

internal monitors.
In particular, disclosure-based reforms that focus on process can spur
those within nonprofit organizations to develop their monitoring skills, and
provide a framework within which these actors can exert their influence.
For example, reliability certification requirements demand that officers
scrutinize their operations, particularly as to financial matters, and establish
and maintain ongoing efforts to examine and safeguard them. If officers are
unsure how to accomplish this, the reliability certification requirement will
prod them to secure the necessary assistance to put adequate measures in

place. Once internal controls have been established, fiduciaries and staff
can continue to use these processes to assist their monitoring and enforcement efforts over time. These internal controls will include procedures by
which information about financial and other lapses will reach managers,
187. See White Paper, supra note 1, at 15. The White Paper describes the intended recipients of the
proposed funding as "nonprofit exempt organizations that educate other tax exempt organizations on
best practices and inform the public of charities that are engaged in best practices" and notes that
"priority would be given to organizations that assist small charities in meeting proper standards and
accreditation." Id. (emphasis added). The White Paper's accreditation proposals include authorization
for the IRS to base charitable status or eligibility to receive charitable donations on accreditation, id. at
14, and requiring government agencies to "give favorable consideration" to accredited organizations in
awarding grants or contracts, id.Several associations of nonprofit organizations offer accrediting programs, in addition to or in concert with offering education on effective governance practices. See supra
note 177.
Accreditation is an intriguing concept, and it may become useful as an adjunct to regulation
over time. Before considering whether delegation tax and government contract determinations would be
prudent, however, additional research is necessary to understand how accrediting organizations conduct
their programs and to evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques they employ. Cf NONPROFIT PANEL
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 41, at 55 (noting that the Panel deferred making recommendations on

accreditation so that itcould review findings from a forthcoming study of nonprofit self-regulatory,
certification, and accreditation systems). This research is beyond the scope of the current Article.
However, it is worth noting that even if this data could be amassed and analyzed, delegation to accrediting agencies should not be considered until provisions are made to monitor the accreditors and the
precision and reliability of their programs. Also, for a comparative analysis of nonprofit accreditation
efforts, see Mark Sidel, The GuardiansGuarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit

Self-Regulation, 80 CH.-KENT L. REv. 803 (2005).
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officers, and directors. If failures do come to light, officers can use the
reliability certification requirement to bolster their demands that they be
addressed and corrected.
An internal controls mandate, like that in the Revised New York Proposals, 8 8 would pursue process enhancements even more directly. The
removal of the disclosure output element-officer certification-from the
proposal appropriately places the regulatory emphasis on improving internal processes and thereby behavior. Auditing oversight reforms also engage
internal monitors straightforwardly, by specifically expanding the responsibility of fiduciaries to examine and discipline auditors. Still, the drawback
to disclosure-based reforms that demand the creation of processes is the
expense of their implementation. 189 Therefore, these reforms should be
applied selectively, targeting only those entities that can bear their costs
without intolerable losses in programs and services. 190
Disclosure reforms that merely increase outputs, on the other hand, often will impose high costs of compliance without energizing internal monitors or providing them opportunities to learn the skills of self-regulation.
Some refinements to forms and questions may provide marginally better
information to regulators and focus compliant officers and organizations on
new data to improve their performance. But, for example, dramatically
increasing the frequency and comprehensiveness of required IRS filings by
exempt organizations is unlikely to prompt criminals or intentionally noncompliant officers or organizations to prevent or correct abuses. It is
unlikely even to motivate them to make more complete and accurate disclosures to the IRS. And if it did, with the Service's current review technology and staff size, its agents might well never happen upon these
damning disclosures. At the same time, the multiplication of filing burdens
188. N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 6
189, As discussed above, supra note 150, disclosure-based reforms that rely on process but are
crafted as mandates for specific governance techniques are also subject to an autonomy critique. However, nonprofits can be instructed to create and maintain effective processes without being compelled to
adopt a string of particular techniques. See, e.g., N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 6
(imposing a general, but generally applicable, internal controls mandate).
190. Although the financial triggers contained in several of the proposed reliability certification
requirements attempt to account for this balance, it should be recognized that asset and revenue size
alone will not always be a good proxy for this cost-benefit determination. Sadly, constructing more
precise triggers is likely beyond the capacity of any legislature.
The Revised New York Proposals attempt to avoid this quandary. The internal controls mandate issued there applies broadly across organizations, but demands that each organization adopt only
those controls that are "reasonable." See N.Y. AG Program Bill 68-05, supra note 17, § 6(a). This tact
will not, however, necessarily solve the problem of implementation cost. The mandate does impose
some minimum requirements, see id. § 6(b), and the reasonableness standard is set to require controls
reasonable to ensure material information reaches the board, not to require only reasonableness in light
of an organization's other priorities, see id. § 6(a).
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would impose unsustainable administrative burdens on those nonprofits
who do attempt to comply. These reforms, therefore, should be used sparingly, if at all.
Other disclosure-based reforms described above fall somewhere in the
middle. Non-duplicative accuracy certifications should motivate compliant
officers to engage in some annual probing of their operations and staff. If
additional penalties are likely, officers' incentives to investigate increase.
Moreover, other nonprofit fiduciaries and employees may be more hesitant
to falsify information or misuse their positions if they are aware that an
officer will be scrutinizing the information contained in the organization's
disclosures. By inserting an outside professional reviewer into a nonprofit's
internal affairs, increased auditing requirements can have a similar effect.
These kinds of reforms will still impose serious, sometimes insurmountable, costs on nonprofits. These costs may result in some improvements in
nonprofit behavior. Yet, they cannot offer the same level of benefits as
process-based reforms, in terms of educating internal monitors and institutionalizing enforcement mechanisms within individual organizations. Legislators should thus view these reforms cautiously because of their potential
to create unjustifiable burdens on nonprofits regulated by them.
Nonprofit reform and accountability should not be pursued primarily
through disclosure. Wherever possible, funding should be increased for the
regulatory staff and fiduciary education necessary to facilitate nonprofit
enforcement and improve nonprofit behavior. To the extent these remedies
are financially and/or politically unavailable, disclosure-based reforms
should be carefully chosen and selectively applied. They can create serious
costs for this vulnerable and vital sector. But, to the extent these costs can
be tolerated, disclosure-based reforms that will facilitate enforcement of
nonprofit obligations, motivate nonprofit fiduciaries to more actively selfmonitor, or both, can generate important and lasting accountability
benefits.
CONCLUSION

Recent efforts by state and federal regulators and legislators to reform
nonprofit accountability might simply be early reactions to a general sense
that "there ought to be a law" to prevent nonprofit scandals. 19 1 These pro191. Legislators' recent efforts at nonprofit reform left another nonprofit commentator with this
same impression of their frustrations, and likewise prompted him to recommend an enforcement alternative. See Michael S. Kutzin, Don't Change the Law-Enforce the Old Ones, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Sept. 30, 2004, at 57.
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posals, however, also share a common focus on disclosure as the route to
achieve desired improvements in nonprofit accountability, notably by mandating officer certification and increased use and oversight of disclosure
auditing. This emphasis on disclosure may reflect legislators' desire to
replicate in the nonprofit context the perceived success of the SarbanesOxley Act in the for-profit context.
However, as legislatures continue to pursue nonprofit reform efforts,
they should be mindful of the limitations of a disclosure model of regulation in the nonprofit sector. For disclosure to induce greater accountability,
it must either stimulate those within disclosing organizations to improve
their behavior or facilitate outside enforcement of their obligations. The
balance of costs and benefits relevant in the nonprofit sector will cause
even compliant nonprofit actors and organizations to limit their investments
in implementing disclosure reforms. Moreover, the lack of funding for
government enforcement and the lack of empowered enforcement alternatives in this sector diminish the accountability value that improved disclosure can promise. To realistically improve nonprofit accountability,
legislators must seriously reconsider the disclosure imperative.
More specifically, legislatures seeking to enhance nonprofit accountability should change their emphasis from enacting new legal requirements
for disclosure to strengthening enforcement of existing laws and educating
nonprofit fiduciaries and employees in how to comply with them. Regulators need resources and technology to police the nonprofit sector, and nonprofit fiduciaries and managers need education and training to enable them
to self-enforce. Disclosure-based reforms should be adopted only if they
will complement invigorated enforcement, motivate improvements in nonprofit behavior, or both. Moreover, the application of such reforms should
be sparing and selective, so that they will not intolerably undercut nonprofits' pursuit of their missions. Only in these limited circumstances can a
disclosure model of regulation truly serve the goal of enhancing nonprofit
accountability.

